

AD-A095 925


DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF EXTERNAL--ETC F/8 5/4  
PROCEEDINGS OF A SERIES OF SEMINARS CONDUCTED IN COOPERATION WITH--ETC(U)  
1976 R ROETT

UNCLASSIFIED

FAR-26602

NL

1 of 2  
NO. 000025



—LEVER#

(1)

THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

1740 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. D. 20036

AREA CODE 202-783-1771

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

20002V

6

Proceedings of a Series of Seminars

Conducted in Cooperation with the Office of the

Assistant Secretary of Defense

(International Security Affairs)

on

National Security Policy Issues

and

Contemporary Portugal

January 26, 1976

February 9, 1976

February 17, 1976


March 2, 1976

and March 9, 1976



Riordan Roett  
Seminar Moderator and Proceedings Editor

Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited



A

The views expressed herein are those of the authors, where so identified, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the Department of Defense or of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

AD A 095325

DDG FILE COPY

THE WASHINGTON CENTER OF FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH

1740 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W.

WASHINGTON, D. D. 20036

AREA CODE 202-785-6272

THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

Proceedings of a Series of Seminars  
Conducted in Cooperation with the Office of the  
Assistant Secretary of Defense  
(International Security Affairs)  
on  
National Security Policy Issues  
and  
Contemporary Portugal

January 26, 1976  
February 9, 1976  
February 17, 1976  
March 2, 1976  
March 9, 1976

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A	

Riordan Roett  
Seminar Moderator and Proceedings Editor

Approved for Public Release  
Distribution Unlimited

The views expressed herein are those of the authors, where so identified, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of the Department of Defense or of the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Pages
Introduction - Riordan Roett	1 -- 19
The Soviet Union, West Europe and Detente: The Russian Role in Portugal - David Binder	20 -- 40
U.S. Foreign Policy and The Iberian Peninsula: Strategic Alternatives - I. William Zartman (with Carlos Martinez)	41 -- 68
NATO, Portugal, Spain -- Iberian Strategic and Defense Issues - Tad Szulc	69 -- 87
Portuguese Withdrawal from Africa, 1974-75: The Angolan Case - Douglas L. Wheeler	88 -- 131

## SEMINAR SERIES ON PORTUGAL

## INTRODUCTION

Riordan Roett

With the support of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), the Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research sponsored a Seminar Series on Portugal during the first three months of 1976. Professor Riordan Roett served as chairman of the Seminar Series.

Five papers were commissioned to serve as a focus for the discussion during each seminar. The ~~authors and their~~ paper titles were:

David Binder, Washington Bureau, The New York Times,  
THE SOVIET UNION, WESTERN EUROPE AND DETENTE: RUSSIA'S  
ROLE IN PORTUGAL.

Kenneth Maxwell, New York City, former Fellow, the  
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University,  
PORTUGUESE POLITICS SINCE APRIL 1974: POLITICAL  
GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES.

Rad Szulc, author and writer, Washington, D.C.,  
NATO, PORTUGAL, SPAIN: IBERIAN STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE ISSUES.

Douglas L. Wheeler, Professor of History, University of  
New Hampshire, PORTUGAL AND AFRICA: POLITICAL AND STRA-  
TEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN DECOLONIZATION.

I.W. Zartman, Department of Politics, New York University,  
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA:  
STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES.

During the Seminar Series, the Center organized a lunch in honor of Dr. Francisco Sa Carneiro, on March 2, 1976, the head of the Popular Democratic Party (PPD), the second largest political party in Portugal. Many of the participants in the Seminar Series attended the lunch.

The five seminars emphasized the strategic aspects of recent developments in Portugal, following the overthrow of the Caetano regime in April 1974. Particular attention was given to the implications of internal political change in Portugal for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; the impact of the Portuguese revolutionary experience on neighboring Spain; the politics and strategic aspects of the decolonization process in Portuguese Africa; and the role of the Soviet Union in Portugal, within a broader framework of Western European security, in the era of détente.

The Binder seminar on January 26 emphasized the Soviet Union's perspective of the Portuguese Revolution and the role of the Portuguese Communist Party prior to and in the period immediately following the coup d'état. From a policy of almost total non-involvement with the Soviet Union during the Salazar and Caetano governments, the successor regime quickly moved to establish diplomatic and commercial ties with Moscow. The return to Portugal from exile of Alvaro Cunhal, the charismatic leader of the Communist party, and

a staunch supporter of the Soviet Union in European Communist Party circles, enabled the Soviet Union to move quickly into a position of totally unexpected importance.

The widespread support for the Soviet Union and the Communist Party, within the post-1974 government, particularly during the successive ministries led by Colonel Vasco Goncalves, heightened concern in the United States and Western Europe about the security threat to NATO posed by the continued, active participation of Portugal in the alliance. That concern increased as it became evident that Moscow instructed Cunhal to, first, align the PCP with the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), the core of the revolutionary program in Portugal; second, activate and control the organized labor movement; and third, presumably, align with the Socialist Party (PSP). The first two objectives were accomplished quickly and efficiently; the third failed to materialize.

Even though the Soviet Union continued to provide tactical advice to the PCP, it was the considered judgement of the Seminar participants that Moscow played a minimal role in Portugal after April 1974. Financial support, while clearly present, was not significant. Given the geographical location of Portugal, it would have been costly and difficult to provide paramilitary or other support services for any

armed movement by the PCP. The prevailing atmosphere of détente mitigated against any overt effort, sponsored by Moscow, to further destabilize the Portuguese government. The final factor that probably deterred Moscow from a more active interest in the Portuguese Revolution was the relatively poor showing of the PCP in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in April 1975 with 12.5% of the popular vote. The vote for the PCP was concentrated in and around Lisbon and in the Alentejo, the southeast region, bordering on Spain.

The Socialists emerged from the April 1974 election as the dominant political force in Portugal; the combined vote of the two moderate-center parties, when combined with the popular support of the PSP, indicated a strong majority of the Portuguese people favored a representative form of government. The battle to define the scope and structure of that government was carried into the long and rancorous debates of the Constituent Assembly for the next year.

Some speculation about the implications of a PCP-Vasco Goncalves effort to preempt the Assembly and declare a dictatorship emerged in the discussions. It was believed by the Seminar participants that the country would have moved to the brink of civil war, given the strong and vocal opposition in the North and in the South, as well as in the Azores, to a radical leftist regime. Moreover, some



reaction from both Spain, bordering on Portugal and well aware of the implications for the last months of the Franco regime of a leftist regime in Lisbon, as well as NATO and Western Europe would have been expected. It was clear that in 1974-1975 that the Soviet Union had some reason to believe that its fortunes in Western Europe were very bright, given the very respectable electoral victories in Italy and France, as well as the emergence in Portugal of a PCP of significance. At the same time, the United States, in Soviet eyes, appeared weakened and beset by domestic problems that would preclude a strong, forceful response to any intrusion of the Soviet Union into Portugal through the PCP.

Discussion focused as well on the impact of the early strength of the Communist Party in Portugal on the parties of neighboring countries, particularly Italy and France. Other topics that were examined included the ultimate strength of Mario Soares as a political leader; the possible move to the right of the Portuguese electorate in the April 1976 parliamentary elections; the support by the PCP for the abortive coup of November 1975 in which the most radical elements of the MFA attempted to overthrow the government; and the financial and economic problems confronting Portugal and the probable role of both the United States and the Western European countries in providing assistance.

The February 9 Seminar dealt with the strategic alternatives for United States foreign policy in the Iberian peninsula. Professor Zartman stressed, in his opening remarks, that it is important to contrast Portugal and Spain. While some analysts have tried to examine the changes in the Iberian peninsula from a common perspective, it is necessary to understand the nature of change in each country.

The role of the Armed Forces is very different in each country. The Portuguese military underwent massive radicalization during the late 1960's and early 1970's that defined its role as a central actor in challenging and destroying the old order. The military became an agent of government opposition and was viewed as a legitimate political actor by all other political groups in Portugal. The same was not true in Spain, where the Armed Forces as an institution had not experienced the colonial experiences of the Portuguese Army, nor had the military developed an ideology and program of action anywhere similar to that of the MFA.

Another important difference separating the two Iberian states is the level of economic development. Spain is nearly twice as developed as Portugal, in terms of GNP per capita, for example. Moreover, Spain's ties to European commerce and industry are far stronger and older. The socio-economic "center" in Spain appears to be a good deal more solidly

in favor of the present regime and less tolerant of ideologically leftist alternatives, although modifications must be expected. Order at the expense of change appears to continue to characterize the Spanish middle groups. The fledgling middle class in Portugal seems to play little role in determining future policy. While less conservative than their counterparts in Spain, the Portuguese middle groups have less influence in the regime. As Zartman commented in his paper, "the relative fates of the right and the left in both countries depends on the tolerance for disorder and the desire for liberty of expression and redistributive change."

The discussion dealt with the various ways the United States viewed the Portuguese Revolution after April 1974 and the implications for American strategic and defense interests in Iberia. It was clear that Washington, at various times, used policies of intervention, isolation and support vis-à-vis Portugal. The real question is whether or not the United States' interest in and possible efforts to influence the political outcome made a difference. On balance, the United States concern about a possible radicalization of Portuguese politics was a very marginal factor in the eventual course of events. American dislike for Vasco Goncalves' Government, clearly manifested in United States government statements as

well as in American support for those factions in Angola not favored by Lisbon, clearly indicated an American preference for political groups other than those then in power.

A primary concern in Washington was to prevent a Communist takeover or the growth of Soviet preeminence, through the PCP, in Portugal. The "wait and see" attitude of Washington policymakers indicated to the government in Lisbon that little was to be gained in attempting to explain or justify its policies to the United States. Moreover, the ideological affinity of the Goncalves government precluded on-going contact and mutual exchange of information, normal under other circumstances.

The emerging battle, envisioned by Zartman and by many of the Seminar participants, will be between pluralist forces, both military and civilian, and rightwing, counterrevolutionary military forces, with strong civilian social support from the most traditional area of the country.

The United States can make a contribution towards the emergence of a moderate, multi-party political system by providing economic assistance and explicitly demonstrating support for moderate, reformist groups, both military and civilian. The role of the United States in Portuguese politics is important in the context of Iberian strategic defense issues in that Spanish stability will, in part, be dependent

on the course of political events in Portugal. American endorsement of and support for a centrist regime, without deploring the reforms already made, is important. While shifting alliances will characterize Portugal for some time to come, it is clear that a moderate majority can remain dominant and will need external European and American support to go about restructuring the economy and dealing with growing and diverse social pressures.

Tad Szulc's seminar on February 17 dealt primarily with the new five year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Spain and the United States. The treaty is seen by many in Spain as the first opening in the European door to Spanish participation in both the Common Market and in NATO. With the beginning of the end of Spanish isolation, at the death of Franco, the possibility for a larger role for Spain in Western Europe must be considered.

Despite the air bases in the Azores, Portugal has played a far more marginal role in United States strategic thinking in the Iberian peninsula than has Spain. That will undoubtedly continue and will define, in part, the response of the United States to a leftist turn in Portuguese politics. Moreover, the American strategic interest in Spain began with the Korean War. An integral part of North American and Western European strategy for more than two decades, the Spanish bases have attained an

importance, both political and strategic, unmatched by any Portuguese facilities.

The Five Year Treaty should be seen from both strategic and political perspectives. In strategic terms, the status quo has been retained with the exception of the denuclearization provisions, specifically demanded by Spain. American military assistance, in dollar terms, is not overly significant. During the discussion, some participants questioned the military argument for the bases, given other options in Western Europe and the changing nature of the role of NATO and Western defense interests in Southern Europe.

The political implications of the Treaty are more significant. The Treaty represents the first formal, bilateral military treaty between the two countries. For Spain, the Treaty is immensely important in providing psychological and political support to the transitional government following Franco. The ending of the political isolation of Spain is uppermost in the minds of today's political leadership and the ratification of the Treaty by the United States Congress is viewed as a first and very significant step in legitimating Spanish claims to a wider role in European affairs generally.

Some discussion in the Seminar dealt with the safeguards that the Senate might require, in considering the Treaty, to

guarantee that the United States was not making a long-range and misunderstood commitment to the incumbent regime. How does the United States indicate its interest in democratization in Spain, while affirming long-standing military and strategic ties with the conservative and authoritarian government in Madrid? The continuing reluctance of many Western European countries to consider Spanish entry into NATO and the European Common Market highlights the difficult choice confronting the United States, to some Seminar participants. Why should the United States assume the burden of legitimating a regime that has not yet shown a strong inclination towards changing the political rules established after the Civil War?

The correctness of the Executive branch's decision to seek formal Senate ratification of the Treaty, in contrast to the executive agreement procedure most often used, was discussed. It was felt that the Executive realized the sensitivity of the Spanish Treaty in the Congress and believed that a commitment of such length and political magnitude required Congressional participation to be meaningful. Moreover, the increasing interest of the Congress in both political and military foreign policy motivated the administration to consult with and seek the advice and consent of the Senate.

The Seminar Series turned to the question of Angola and the Portuguese withdrawal from its former colony on March 2. With the independence of the other Portuguese colonies of Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, the Cape Verde Islands, and the islands of Sao Tome and Principe, Angola remained the wealthiest and most difficult of the colonial holdings to administer. With the outbreak of full scale fighting, and the eruption of civil war, the question of broader strategic interests, Great Power involvement, and foreign mercenary participation in the alleged "liberation struggle" emerged as topics of immediate significance.

If Portugal had been able to withdraw relatively peacefully, why was Angola the exception? Several factors in the Angolan case were radically different from the other colonies. The rivalry among Angolan nationalist groups was fierce and uncompromising in contrast to the other colonies where one movement dominated the drive for freedom. Portuguese settlers had a far higher social and economic stake in Angola than in the other colonies and, somewhat like the Algerian situation, were a potent political factor. Angola represented the wealthiest segment of the Portuguese Empire. The petroleum of Cabinda, the rich deposits of other natural resources, and the importance of Angola in the general scheme of Portuguese economic growth all combined to make Lisbon recalcitrant in confronting



the realities in the Angolan situation. Finally, the radicalization of the Portuguese Armed Forces, well advanced by the time the civil war in Angola erupted, made Angola a focal point for differing policies and approaches to colonial independence and to competitive ideological preferences.

The Alvor Agreement of January 10, 1975 was a negotiated effort to end the warfare among the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. Previously negotiated cease-fires were to be respected and all three movements were to cooperate in building a national army for Angola. The Portuguese transferred power to a transitional government, composed of representatives of all three movements. Finally, the Agreement called for elections to be held in October, 1975 to select a new, national government. By March 1975 the Agreement was shattered. Civil war erupted in late March and the transitional government barely functioned. Elections were never held and the official day of "Independence" on November 11, 1975 saw the Portuguese authorities granting freedom to the people of Angola; no government appeared to exist that could accept the transfer of power.

For the Portuguese government in Lisbon, the civil war in Angola presented international problems of significance but, simultaneously, internal issues became paramount. With the steady flow of Angolan refugees into Portugal, the overburdened

government of Vasco Goncalves found itself unable to respond with social and economic assistance. As well, the government found itself confronted with openly hostile refugee groups that blamed the incumbent government for the loss of home and property.

The Vasco Goncalves government's preference among the three competing independence movements in Angola was clearly the Marxist-oriented MPLA. The MPLA was receiving assistance from the Soviet Union, and was viewed by the United States and its allies as the least preferable of the three movements. The United States appeared first to favor the FNLA, which operated from a supply base in neighboring Zaire, and later the UNITA, the smallest but perhaps the best organized group.

The tension increased when it became known that Prime Minister Fidel Castro of Cuba had sent troops to Angola to support the MPLA and that a good deal of the actual fighting took place between the Soviet supplied and supported Cuban troops and the two opposition groups, the FNLA and UNITA, then combining their forces in an effort to counter-balance the MPLA and its strong Soviet-Cuban backing. With the open participation of Cuban revolutionary forces in Angola, and the strong reaction from the governments of Rhodesia and South Africa, a new and vital series of strategic questions were raised.

The United States was confronted by a series of untenable

options in Angola. From the beginning, in the 1960's, the United States support for the FNLA, backed by Zaire, had placed Washington firmly against the Marxist-oriented, Soviet supported, MPLA. When the dominant faction in the Portuguese MFA endorsed the MPLA, the United States found itself at odds with both the revolutionary government in Lisbon and the emerging favorite to win power in Angola. After the MPLA capture of Luanda, the Angolan capital, in July 1975, the United States had few strategic and political options left. In addition, the strong statements of the Secretary of State and the President were not met with corresponding support from the American Congress. Strong and immediate reactions from Capitol Hill indicated that the Congress remained unalterably opposed to any United States participation or intervention in the civil war underway in Angola, regardless of the alleged strategic and geopolitical consequences for United States allies in the south of Africa.

In contrast, the Soviet Union and Cuba emerged as supporters of the majority. The MPLA, with Soviet and Cuban assistance, became the de facto and finally the de jure government of independent Angola. The question of whether or not the government of Agostinho Neto in Luanda wished to see Angola used as a launching pad for revolutionary expeditions against southern African countries is not clear. The length of time the Cuban troops will be allowed to stay in Angola is not

settled yet. Is there a possibility that the newly independent Angola will become "colonized" by Cuban revolutionary forces, with Soviet backing, to launch a series of infiltration and subversion operations in the south?

For the Portuguese government, the problem of the retornados or returned refugees continues as a major domestic issue. Moreover, any hope of Portugal normalizing relations with Angola and being in a position to discuss property rights, compensation, etc., is now debatable. Since the Portuguese government refused to recognize the MPLA as the government in November 1975, and waited until the situation had clarified, the Luanda regime feels little need to work out a political compromise with Lisbon.

The final meeting of the Seminar Series dealt with the internal political situation in Portugal since the Revolution of April 1974. Dr. Maxwell discussed the origins of the April 1974 movement. To understand the overthrow of the Caetano regime, it is necessary to examine the economic transformations taking place in Portugal in the mid and late 1960's. The Portuguese agricultural base declined; the industrial and service sectors grew; large scale emigration of workers to Western Europe provided increasing amounts of foreign exchange; and the colonial wars drained national resources, both human and material.

The assumption of power by General Spínola in April 1974 focused attention on two broad issues- disengagement from Africa and economic development. The Spínola faction, supported by the Portuguese private sector, favored a slow, planned withdrawal from Africa and rapid economic modernization, with emphasis on an open market and foreign investment. The radical wing of the MFA wanted abrupt, immediate withdrawal and the granting of independence to the colonies and a program of economic equity for the disadvantaged segments of Portuguese society. The private sector concept, and private foreign investment, were anathema to the MFA group.

With the downfall of the old order, political authority collapsed in Portugal. Discipline and organization were lacking; effective government was all but impossible. The purging of the bureaucracy had opened the administration of the Portuguese state to Marxist and Communist appointments who cared little for efficiency and rationality in government. The PCP made early and important gains within the state apparatus, but failed to predominate. The "siege" mentality that had characterized the party for decades failed to wither away. The PCP found itself unable to control the radical left and soon became a target of derision for the radical groups who accused the PCP of bourgeois tendencies. The Socialist Party of Mário Soares emerged as a strong, viable opponent

of the PCP soon after April 1974, something that Alvarho Cunhal and his followers had discounted previously.

The combined strength of the moderate right, led by the PPD, and the center-left forces, symbolized by the Socialists, offered a relatively wide range of political options to the Portuguese electorate. The strength of the Communist Party, concentrated in and around Lisbon and in the farming region of the Aletejo, never expanded into other regions. The Socialists, especially, and the PPD, were more broadly representative parties, even though they have been unable or unwilling to work out a compromise which would allow them to eventually share power.

With the removal of General Spínola from office, and the consequent flight of the General into exile, the radical wing of the MFA was in full control of the government. It was only with the party crisis in the summer of 1975, when the Socialists withdrew from the cabinet, and the threat of civil war appeared possible, that a new coalition of moderate forces began to emerge to challenge the then-prevailing economic and social assumptions of the Vasco Gonçalves group. The coalescing of moderate and right of center groups, indicated the strong majority that segment of Portuguese society still represented. The unsuccessful effort in November 1975, by the radical left to redress the balance, finally settled the issue of predom-

ance; the moderate center emerged as the strongest group in politics.

The issues confronting the government of Premier Azvedo are serious. Unemployment continues to grow. Balance of payments problems haunt the regime. The pressures from urban, middle class groups over consumer issues remain highly salient. The Angolan refugees remain a potential destabilizing force. The Vasco Goncalves government's programs of nationalization have decimated the private sector. Recent foreign credits are largely unused given the administrative disorganization of the state bureaucracy.

While the original strategic concerns of the United States about continued Portuguese participation in NATO, as well as the effect of the radicalization of Portugal on neighboring countries, have declined, the internal problems with which the government must deal continue as a source of worry. The inherent instability of the present configuration of power, and the continued popularity of the Communist Party, with about fifteen percent of the electorate, would indicate a period of continual readjustment. The government has turned to economic and social issues, although not to the exclusion of security and political problems, but the recovery will be long and painful and will require understanding and support from Portugal's allies.

## THE SOVIET UNION, WEST EUROPE AND DETENTE:

## THE RUSSIAN ROLE IN PORTUGAL

David Binder

In March, 1974, the last full month of rule by the authoritarian right-wing government of Prime Minister Mario Caetano in Lisbon, the Soviet Union had neither diplomatic relations nor trade with Portugal. Though sapped by colonial wars, the Portuguese armed forces were still fully integrated in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Azores airbase had just gone through extensive use by giant American cargo planes in the urgent resupply effort for Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Portugal's colonies, for the most part bogged down in struggles against native guerillas, were still intact. The country's economic-social system could at best be described as conservative- a haven for the few rich and a treadmill for the many poor. The Portuguese Communist Party was miniscule and operating in illegality- its leader, Alvaro Cunhal, in exile in East Europe, a man wanted at home, where he had escaped from prison.

Scarcely two years later the Soviet Union has flourishing diplomatic relations with Portugal. The two countries have a joint economic commission and there is a modicum of trade in goods desired by Moscow. The Portuguese armed forces are in disarray and hardly able to fulfill



N.A.T.O. commitments. (nor has Portugal taken its rightful turn in the defense alliance's sensitive Nuclear Planning Group in this period). The Azores airbase is probably no longer available to the United States for a possible re-supply effort on behalf of Israel in the event of new Middle East hostilities- at least that is what the Lisbon authorities said last year. Portugal's last substantial colony- Angola- was granted independence in November. The socio-economic system has been altered to the extent of nationalizing banks, land seizures and collectivizations, the flight of numerous wealthy Portuguese and the mobilization of trade unions. The Portuguese Communist Party, after a series of triumphs and defeats, is larger and is playing an active role in the country's politics.

In brief, then, the unique and eccentric course of Portuguese politics since the 1974 officer's coup has left the Soviet Union and its East European allies in a far more enviable position with regard to Lisbon than they might have dared dream. "A net gain for the Soviet Union," is the way an Administration official described the outcome of 21 months of political turmoil in Portugal.

To be sure, there were setbacks for Soviet interests in Portugal, particularly with regard to the loudly proclaimed support of Alvaro Cunhal, the leader of the

Portuguese Communist Party, and to the effects that this had on the other West European Communist parties. Cunhal is down if not out as a result of the carousel spins of Portuguese politics over the last twelve months. The power of the Portuguese Communist Party is waning, it appears, though not in eclipse. But in the meantime, a far greater prize appears to have fallen into the Soviet lap: Angola. This, too, is a result of the radical change in Lisbon, even if it is not a direct product of the work of Cunhal. However, one might cogently argue that the sudden buildup of Soviet military supplies and advisers last summer and fall in the strip of Angola held under the control of the Popular Movement headed by Agostinho Neto was stimulated by frustration of Soviet designs in Portugal: Better an Angola in Africa than a Portugal in Europe, the reasoning might have gone. Nor should it be ignored that Leftist sympathizers in the Portuguese colonial army provided Neto's forces with logistical assistance in opening the port of Luanda to Communist supply ships last spring. Some of these sympathizers also stayed to fight for Neto in Angola. In other words, the "socialistic path" espoused in Lisbon by young Portuguese officers after the successful coup of 1974 had its reprise in some of the colonies where they had learned the Marxist word from their own prisoners in

the years before. Angola, for example, the largest and potentially the richest of these colonies, did not achieve independence until November 11, 1975, by which time a full-fledged civil war was under way. It has since been established that several hundred or more Angolan Portuguese have fought on behalf of Holden Roberto's Front for the National Liberation of Angola and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola. But it is now fairly well established that a sizeable number of the old colonial army joined the Popular Movement at a critical juncture.

Given the Angola success of the Soviet-backed Popular Movement and given the relatively advantageous position the Soviet Union has achieved in state relations with Portugal since the coup, one might ask what would have been the maximum Soviet goal in the Portuguese situation.

Looking back to the spring of 1974, the Soviet foreign policy outlook was by no means rosy. The United States had achieved a dominant role in the Middle East as mediator, replacing the Soviet Union as the most influential power in Egypt and beginning to match it in Syria. The United States was still heavily engaged in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. Brezhnev had even urged Cuba's Castro to make détente overtures to Washington. Western Europe had gotten over the worst of its wrangles with Sec-

retary of State Kissinger and was starting to consider a producer-consumer dialogue on raw materials. Uppermost on Soviet minds, as far as Europe was concerned, was the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was bogged down. Détente with the United States was coming under increasing fire from Senator Henry Jackson, who was already in the process of torpedoing the deal that would have exchanged greater American trading benefits for emigration of more Soviet Jews. Henry Kissinger was otherwise riding high and it seemed the Soviet Union was on the defensive. Richard Nixon was still in office and as the Soviets knew, capable of starting surprise actions.

That was the short-range view. In the longer range view the Soviet Union had already long since staked out its areas of vital interest and concern in Europe. It had capped an essentially defensive policy with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to "protect Socialism" in a sphere more or less ceded by the West to the Russians as an area of special interest in 1938 at Munich. This definition of interest was further hardened by the four-power Berlin Agreement of August 1971, ending a quarter century of periodic contests and tensions. It was the Berlin Agreement that paved the way for the 35-nation Helsinki Conference and subsequent negotiations in Geneva. The essence of that unique diplomatic effort was the sealing of the European status quo- and by implication also, the European spheres of interest, with the West allied to the

American superpower and the East to the Soviet superpower, give or take a neutral Finland, Sweden, Austria and Switzerland.

With this background it was unlikely, if not inconceivable, that the Soviet Union would be tempted into a major venture in Portugal at the very extremity of Western Europe- where it had no basis of influence, no physical links and, apparently, little expertise.

By contrast, incidentally, one could mention Agostinho Neto, the physician-poet leader of the Angolan Popular Movement, who had received arms and money sporadically from the Soviet Union ever since he started fighting the Portuguese colonial authorities more than 17 years ago. Undoubtedly it was easier, and probably more productive, for the Soviet Union to give practical support to a national liberation movement than to Communist Party in a Western country that was not only illegal, but small. According to Western intelligence estimates in 1973 the Portuguese Communist Party numbered about 1,000 cadres, although it doubtless had more sympathizers, especially at Portuguese universities and among the so-called intelligentsia. But its leader, Cunhal, had been in exile for years and his one notable accomplishment outside of Portugal was a resounding endorsement of the Warsaw Pact intervention in

Czechoslovakia in 1968. Perhaps he was making a wish for Portugal, even though the two countries had virtually nothing in common other than to be eccentric in the general European historical context. Still, Cunhal was something of a folk hero, having escaped from a Portuguese fortress-prison and made his way abroad, a white-haired lawyer with black beetle brows and an impressive military countenance. He was one of those who had suffered in the jails of Salazar's dictatorship and, as such, he was given a proper hero's welcome when he arrived at the Lisbon airport a few weeks after the April coup.

Cunhal was then and remained not only Moscow's chief consul but also its chief counsel in Portugal, despite his and the Communists' total unfamiliarity with the events that had precipitated the coup or with the military men who were promoting the change. But he had a lot to recommend him. He was loyal to Moscow as few other West European Party leaders at a time of resistance by French, Italian, Spanish, Rumanian, Yugoslav and Belgian Communists to Soviet regulation in the struggle with Mao's China and in the definition of Communist interests in the non-aligned world as well as in Western European parliamentary democracies. In addition, he had cadres under his command and he was, after all, something of a hero. Presumably the

foreign party specialists in the Kremlin had not given much thought to Portugal before. So they were more than usually dependent on a man like Cunhal.

The coup that overthrew the last of the Salazar regime originated in the colonies in the wars against the independence movements of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. The regime's adversaries were mostly Marxist in their orientation and obtaining various qualities and quantities of assistance from the Soviet Union, China and Cuba. At home the Portuguese were sinking deeper into economic and social despair, locked as before in semi-feudal conditions and increasingly isolated from the developments of the rest of the Western world, particularly its industry. Portuguese were emigrating to northern Europe to work as they had before to the African and Asian colonies or to Brazil and the United States. The Lisbon dictatorship was, like other Fascist dictatorships, unable to renew itself. It had become utterly sterile. Curiously, Prime Minister Caetano was fully aware of this situation and anxious to reform, but feared that any move, especially a withdrawal from the colonies, would bring on a right-wing putsch and, possibly, civil war. Ironically, it was a right-wing Army officer, Cavalry General Antonio de Spínola, who sparked his downfall in a book published in the winter of 1974 pre-

dicting that Portugal would lose all its colonial wars. However, if Spinola was right about the Portuguese colonies, he was wrong in his apparent assumption that a coup would automatically keep Portugal in a familiar Western and conservative framework. He had not reckoned with younger, junior officers whose ideas were decidedly left of his own even if far from the orthodox Marxist-Leninist practice. It was they, "the Captains," who soon set the political tone of the immediate post-Salazar era, men unknown in Washington and in Moscow named Goncalves, Jesuino, Carvalho and Antunes. They were not Marxists. But they considered themselves leftists in an unstudied way, even though they had scarcely a nodding acquaintance with the standard works of Socialism. "If you only knew what idealists we are," Commander Jesuino told American hosts when he visited Washington in the spring of 1975. Others spoke with equally idealistic fervor.

It would have seemed to be an almost perfect field of operation for an orthodox Communist like Cunhal, who did know his Marxist texts, who was a proven political leader, who had been triumphantly welcomed home, and who was now appointed a minister without portfolio in the new provisional government of Lisbon. Spinola quit in September when he failed to prevent a Communist Party rally in Lisbon.



Again in retrospect, it appears that Cunhal had received two basic instructions from Moscow: to ally himself as closely as possible with the Armed Forces Movement that was early in command and to cultivate the moribund Portuguese labor movement. He was assisted in the latter function by a Communist Minister of Labor whose successor, a military man, was also sympathetic to the Left. Heavy on the minds of the Soviet bloc Communists who were in jubilation over the turn of events in Portugal was the debacle, less than one year before, of the cause of the Left in Salvador Allende's Chile. There it had been the fate of the regular Communists to be superseded in power and influence by the far left Mirista, and to lack allies that would have been able to stay close to power after an upheaval. Moscow was apparently determined not to repeat the Chilean mistakes or the Chilean setback in Portugal. Presumably Cunhal received one more instruction: to make common cause with the Portuguese Socialist Party of Mario Soares, another lawyer, who had founded his little band in West Germany in 1973 with the assistance of Chancellor Willy Brandt. It was to be, nominally, a reissue of what had been, nominally, the United Front or Popular Front strategy of the 1930's as defined in 1935 by the Comintern. But this was obviously a less forceful order and, although Cunhal did make gestures in the direction of a Popular Front from time to time, his heart was no

more in it than was the heart of Stalin in it during the Spanish Civil War. It was a sham and, as Cunhal's influence in the Armed Forces Movement grew through the fall and winter of 1974-75, he made no pretense of his contempt for Soares and the Portuguese Socialists. Nor was there ever a breath of public criticism of Cunhal, direct or implicit, in the Soviet press regarding his handling of the Popular Front tactic. It was a case of the unrecorded Leninist principle of pragmatism: "If it works it is Leninist- if it doesn't work it is un-Leninist." Nevertheless, there is a fairly substantial body of evidence that, regardless of the tactical considerations of the moment, Moscow did counsel Cunhal to take it easy- not to push too hard too fast. Communist diplomats in Washington said as much and it has also been reported that Edward Gierek, the Polish Communist Party chief, passed on similar advice when he visited Lisbon in January, 1975. If this was the case, and it certainly seems to have been so, then one may assume that Alvaro Cunhal had a relatively unfettered hand as the chief Communist and the Communist chief in Portugal- enough so, at least he was getting advice rather than orders. Or, if they were orders, he felt free to disregard or freely interpret some of them. So much freedom, in fact, that he felt at liberty to pour scorn on the effort to hold constituent assembly elections

in 1975 and at liberty to give an interview to Oriana Fallaci in which he made a mockery of the attempts to democratize Portugal in the Western sense by declaring that post-coup Portugal would "never" have a parliamentary democracy. At that point, it may be worth recalling, Communist officials in Eastern Europe began privately describing Cunhal as a "disaster."

Yet through 1974 and 1975 Cunhal was also obtaining financial assistance from the Soviet bloc. Apparently, nobody among the Western governments even has a clue as to how much East European assistance. During the spring and summer it was popular among some right-wing American politicians to assert that the Portuguese Communist Party was receiving "massive" Soviet aid, and the figure of \$10 million a month was mooted. But that would have obviously choked a party as small as the Portuguese Communist Party. There was another intelligence estimate of \$3 million a month. But that, too, could never be substantiated. In short, no one in Washington has even a rough guess as to how much money the Soviet bloc might have put into Portugal covertly on behalf of Communist clients. But there is general agreement that there was some financial aid, which permitted Cunhal to plaster the country with Communist posters, to run a big press, and, possibly, to rent demonstrators for the

hundreds of rallies his party has staged.

To suggest, however, as some anti-Communists have done on this side of the Atlantic, that Soviet aid played a crucial role in launching and maintaining Cunhal or that the Soviet KGB saturated Portugal with masterminding agents can surely be dismissed as a gross exaggeration. No, Cunhal's rise and fall seem instead to have been largely a result of homegrown factors and, while the Soviet Union played a role in Portugal, it was not a decisive role.

Still, there were some odd moments. There was an election for the Constituent Assembly, which gave the Socialists of Soares a 37.8% plurality together with the 26.4% of the Popular Democrats, and 7.5% for the Social Democratic Center an overwhelming rejection of the far left. The Cunhal party got 12.5% and the more extremist Portuguese Democratic Movement got 5%- a sorry showing. Cunhal chose, unluckily for his future, to ignore it, as did his leftist allies in the ruling Armed Forces Movement.

Instead of acknowledging the predominantly anti-Communist or non-Communist nature of the vote he pressed for further radicalization of the Portuguese political situation. He was buoyed perhaps by the increasing support he detected from Premier Vasco Goncalves, who had already

cast his lot with the Left, and by the defeat of an abortive coup of senior officers, apparently including General Spínola in March 1975. Buoyed as well, possibly, by a narrow perception of the political situation determined in recent years by the emotions of a man imprisoned for his convictions and then subjected to the rigors of exile.

In any case he pressed, with Moscow's acquiescence, for the further moves to eliminate the power of Soares and the Socialists. The chosen fields were the press and the trade unions, where the Communists were already powerful. With the assistance of Communist printers the far left attempted to close down Republica, the last major voice of the Socialists. The struggle dragged on in a chaotic atmosphere from late May until July 1975. As Cunhal and Premier Gonçalves moved to take full power, Mario Soares confronted them with what was at the least a formal problem and serious embarrassment by resigning from the Cabinet July 10, soon pulling the Popular Democrats with him. Soares boldly demanded the resignation of Premier Gonçalves. By this time, because of land seizures and nationalizations, the mood of many Portuguese had turned around- also in the Armed Forces. The country had been subjected to more than a year of propaganda claiming that Portugal was going through a revolution,

although nothing resembling a true Marxist revolution was yet in sight: no mobilization of the masses, no vanguard of the proletariat, no real civil strife, no genuine transfer of the "ownership of the means of production." In their place was only confusion and a touch of anarchy. In their place also was what real Marxists-Leninists might have termed and later did term a "pre-revolutionary" stage or, in a vague sense, a "bourgeois-democratic revolution." Nevertheless, ordinary Portuguese were being subjected to a drumfire of "revolution" propaganda and, after nearly four decades of political lethargy, a growing number of them were becoming frightened. Portuguese workers were pouring home from Western Europe to join the ranks of the unemployed at home, a product of the energy crisis-inflation-recession trends. Many more thousands of Portuguese were fleeing to the metropole from Angola and other colonies. Finally, there were the soldiers idled by the retreat from the colonies. The economy was in a shambles.

The change became evident first in the conservative north of Portugal and then, as civilian attacks on Communist Party installations mounted, in the military itself. The latter contests were exacerbated by unresolved rivalries in the top leadership of the Armed Forces Movement, which Cunhal had infiltrated but not yet dominated.

Yet at this moment he made his strongest bid for a power seizure, accompanied by almost euphoric reporting in the Soviet bloc press and riding on the coattails of Premier Goncalves.

Nevertheless, there remained an element of skepticism, perhaps even of outright doubt in the Soviet leadership about the ability of Cunhal and Goncalves to carry it off. The Soviets had never written off Soares as Cunhal had. At this very time, in the peak period of the Portuguese Communists, Pravda and Komunist carried editorials more or less supporting the Cunhal practice, that a Communist Party was obligated to behave as the "vanguard of the proletariat." This was followed by a long and rather malign commentary in Problems of Peace and Socialism, a holdover from Comintern and Cominform days, by its managing editor, Konstantin I. Zadarov, proclaiming that democracy was not "an arithmetical concept" (especially in Portugal where the Communists had lost, he implied) and hinting that other Western Communist Parties had sacrificed their proletarian credentials by making all too convenient alliances with bourgeois parties. As if to underscore the importance of the statement, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Party Chief, embraced Zadarov a month after publication. It was probably a case of the

"best defense is the offense." For the Russians- and Cunhal- had already been sharply disavowed by the Communist leaders of Italy and France, who were appalled at the ham-handedness of the Portuguese Communists and the threat they posed to their own tactics of sweet reason and common cause with the non-Communist parties of their own countries.

Cunhal's fortunes continued to decline. Goncalves came under increasing pressure and then was forced to resign from the Premiership, only to lose his next post in the Armed Forces a few weeks later. The next cabinet of Jose Pinheiro de Azevedo had only one Communist.

The Communist leader took desperate steps, briefly participating in a far left United Revolutionary Front with what would properly have been regarded in Moscow terms as dreaded Trotskyites. He was further compromised in November by being briefly identified with the leftist military radicals who attempted to overthrow the Azevedo government and failed so miserably. All this time the Soviet bloc press was steadily decreasing its coverage of Portugal and, particularly of Alvaro Cunhal. He had served his purpose. Now his one time protégé-protector, General Otelo de Carvalho, is in jail facing a possible treason trial- the man who visited Fidel Castro last summer and



declared that he would be the Castro of Europe.

Cunhal may feel that he has been badly used. But from the point of view of Moscow he has been well used. His strength was enough to make the Communist Party, however small in its pre-coup stage, a formidable factor in Portuguese politics- so much so that the present Government has hesitated to bar Communists from active politics. Moreover, President Francisco de Costa Gomes saw fit to pay an official visit to the Soviet Union in October. He would have been accompanied by Foreign Minister Antunes had the precarious situation in Lisbon allowed. As it was Antunes made it to Prague and Budapest.

One might also argue that the Soviet Union has never really had to face the music in Portugal as it had done in other critical situations such as the Prague reform efforts of 1968.

Suppose for instance that Cunhal and Goncalves had carried off a seizure of power and found themselves confronted, as they probably would have been confronted, with either a sharp action by the N.A.T.O. countries, or a civil war- or both. A situation, in other words, in which the Soviet Union would have been the address for the Portuguese Communist cries for assistance. What would the Soviet Union have done then? Could it have ferried arms

and/or advisers by sea or air to Portugal. Would it have done so? The answers probably come down to Nyet.

Rather, the best that they might have hoped for in the Soviet Union would have been for a far Left regime in Portugal, divorced from NATO or at least reserve toward it, but still a hop or skip removed from communism, Moscow style. Who knows, they might have even gotten the West to pay for it. Certainly the credits were in the offing.

Nor is it all over yet, judging from the desperate state of the Portuguese economy and the practice acquired by ordinary Portuguese in demonstrating and striking.

In the two years since the Lisbon coup the Soviet Union has watched Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos go down the American drain. Thailand is neutral now. India has taken a further turn away from us and towards them. Portugal's African colonies have all moved toward or been dragged toward the Socialist camp. Greece and Turkey are at odds and increasingly anti-American. Canada is edging toward neutrality. Latin America is sour. West Europe is floundering between inflation and recession. The United States itself appears leaderless, self-destructive and decadent, with 18 or more Presidential candidates- most of them

virtual unknowns. Spain is uncertain after Franco. Little Portugal merely fits into the pattern.

No wonder the Soviet authorities marked the 40th anniversary of the seventh Congress of the Communist International last autumn with a gleaming sense of triumph and expectation of further triumphs.

Before World War II, they noted, there were Communist parties in 59 countries, with a total of 4 million members. Today there are 89 Communist Parties with a total membership of over 60 million- 2.4 million of them in Western Europe. Before the War Communists ruled only in the Soviet Union and Mongolia and today in 30 countries.

Mistakes? Yes, those, too. There are Communist Parties, the commentators say, which have ignored the value of the "middle strata,"- Chile, Portugal?- in extending revolutions. Parties, too, which paid too little attention "to the proletariats' class interests" on the one hand or denied "the necessity for the general democratic stage in the anti-monopoly struggle." Both harmful trends, in the Moscow view, especially when they prove to be disastrous as in Portugal or Chile.

But it should not be forgotten that the same commentators, among them V.V. Zagladin, who is Brezhnev's foreign policy adviser in the CPSU Central Committee, point

out that: "It was under the conditions of détente that the fascist regime was eliminated in Portugal." Eliminated. Under the conditions of détente. That rated a big plus in Moscow and it is something to think about here.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE IBERIAN PENINSULA:  
STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES

I. William Zartman  
(with Carlos Martinez)

Since the general topic of this seminar concerns Lusophonic Africa as well as the Iberian peninsula, and since I have just returned from a trip to central Africa as well as Europe, I would like to begin by unburdening myself of some feelings as a result of that trip, which might provide additional material for the foreign policy debate of the seminar. The following five points are admittedly feelings after discussions with many different types of audiences, not public opinion polls, and they are more related to the Angolan situation than to current strategic alternatives in Iberia. Neither of these considerations, however, makes them any less relevant to the foreign policy debate. It will also be noted that, taken together, the five points contain some internal contradictions; that merely means that they are related to reality, not to some ideal construct, and that they contain the divergent considerations that a foreign policy debate must reconcile.

1. The United States has correctly learned the lessons of Vietnam. Public and policymakers alike have been burned by the experience of overcommitting resources to fight the impossible fight. As so often happens, it took a disastrous failure to learn Lippman's lesson that a state must keep its ends and means in balance and that in the absence of a policy that meets this imperative events themselves will restore the equilibrium. Although this procedural lesson is clear enough, the substantive one is less so: public and policymakers probably do not agree as to which fights are impossible. Nevertheless, there is doubtless a minimal consensus that colonial wars are not a worthy cause, and that American troops (soldiers, volunteers, advisors) are not to be used, presumably for other than major or surgical operations. (A further rule of the Cold War, which appears to be unchanged, is that American or Russian troops will not be used where the other is already present, since escalation would be hard to avoid in the case of direct contact).
2. The United States has incorrectly overlearned the lessons of Vietnam. Although there is general agreement that the country should not become involved in future Vietnams, there is no agreement as to what another Vietnam looks like before it happens. As a result, we have become gun-

shy, and instead of examining alternative strategies or identifying situational characteristics and evolutions, we have been busy disarming ourselves. A healthy attempt to guard against a repetition of CIA excesses has led to a blurring of distinctions between efforts to overthrow an established government in Chile and attempts to buttress established political parties in Angola, and this muddying of dark waters has been aided by inept efforts by the executive to define American national interest in regard to the African conflict. We have avoided a frequent American reaction to policy failures that consists of seeking out a foreign scapegoat, to be sure, but the ensuing self-examination has left the traditional instruments of foreign policy seriously weakened at a time when we need and sometimes want to carry out an active foreign policy. As a result, we fall again into the ends-means trap: with foreign policy ends already poorly-defined, foreign policy is being hobbled by a weakening of the means, decidedly a way of unhorsing the cart.

3. We are not only a weak ally but a weak implementor of our own aims. Our adversary in détente is not hampered by the same qualms and contradictions. This is not to argue that their ends should be used to justify our means; one of the worst arguments would be to maintain that we

should meet in kind every challenge that is thrown at us. But it is to say that parties looking for outside support find no reason in our recent actions for turning to the United States for help; instead they find that Soviet-backed sides do better. In Angola we followed- for reasons mentioned above- the worst halves of two policies: by giving a little help to the losers, we have become firmly associated with defeat, and we have insured that the Soviets emerge associated with a victory. As a result, we have neither supported the winning side nor won for the side we supported, nor have we used our policy to force the Angolan parties to rely on their own forces by holding off Soviet involvement through the use of policy moves outside of Angola. The striking aspect of American policy has been the refusal to use wheat (or other items) to dissuade Soviet involvement. The striking aspect of Soviet policy has been its ability to bring in over 10,000 Cuban troops. The move is a major development and is filled with ironies. After the United States and Latin American countries have been able to hold in check Cuban subversion of the Hemisphere, Cuba has effectively extended its subversion to a third continent; prevented from being a hemispheric power, Cuba has become a world power (in this sense), and Spanish claims of Cuban advisors in the Western Sahara indicate additional possibilities.



4. We frequently help those who cannot help themselves. The criticism that American policy supports dictators is way beside the point; the problem is rather that we carry our natural sympathy for underdogs to extremes by encouraging parties which lack faith, will, support, means or programs (some of whom can then maintain themselves in power only through the use of political controls). The list of weaknesses on "our side" in Angola is one of its most impressive aspects: an African party which understands Africans little enough to involve South Africa on its behalf, another whose closest support comes from a Zairian army which defects before it reaches its own border. The danger of any foreign support is that it becomes habit-forming, and the exacerbating danger of the cold war is that it pushes ad hoc aid into an expectation of long-term commitments, so that aid becomes dependency and self-reliance becomes a rarity.

5. Beyond the dangers of failure on specific policy aims, there is the further danger in these characteristics of rebound: a cyclical disaffection with our own practice of foreign policy that can either lead to further weakness or to a new overassertiveness.

Human events are by their nature resistant and sometimes

impervious to analytical ordering, and the above reflections, with their references to "sides" and "success", may seem more appropriate to football than to foreign policy. It is always possible that they represent erroneous generalizations on a momentary situation. They are certainly caricatural, in that they exaggerate real characteristics. But for all the importance of a concern for accuracy, whether the exaggeration exceeds the reality is in one sense less important than whether the image is believed. The above reflections have been frequently heard, both in America and in Africa from people with a basic sympathy to the United States. The danger of foreign policy rebound is as real as the image.

## I

The following discussion deals with American interests and policies in regard to Spain and Portugal in 1975 and 1976. The first section on interests concerns and compares both countries, but the subsequent discussion focusses on Portugal alone; nonetheless, the categories and considerations, while not transferrable from Portugal to Spain, should provide the framework for an examination of American relations with Madrid. This presentation does

not claim to present new facts but hopefully to offer some different interpretations which can serve as the basis for debate on the topic.

A consideration of strategic foreign policy alternatives should begin with a survey of strategic interests. "Strategic" is often considered to refer basically to geopolitical considerations, whereas "interests" often carries an initial connotation of economic considerations. Let it be said from the outset that this paper will pay little attention to the economic aspects of interest, largely because they do not seem primary. American investment, bilateral trade, sources of raw materials- such matters are not at a high enough level to provide a rationale for American concern over Iberia. Indeed, if they operate at all, they should provide justification for Iberian concern over American concern over Iberia, since America occupies a larger role in Iberian economic affairs than Iberia does in American economics. Strategic interests, then, seem to be primarily geopolitical and- as a less classical argument will develop- ideopolitical.

Despite the accident of its creation, geography has provided Europe with an unusually symmetrical shape. Flanking the central Carolingian headland are two outlying redoubts: insular Britain and peninsular Iberia, separated from the

mainland by a moat and a wall, respectively. Although strategic considerations have changed since the days when moats and walls were primary defense features, it is still true as always that spatial control and spatial relations are of crucial importance both as ends and means. Thus, it is inaccurate to argue that Iberia's importance at the mouth of the Mediterranean and on the flank of Europe is outmoded, either in war or in peace, since the avoidance of war and the maneuvers of peace often depend on elements of proximity, observation, staging and denial that friendly relations with Iberia provide. Similarly, the location of the Azores 2500 miles from New York, 1000 miles from Lisbon, and 3500 miles from Beirut is a fact of spatial relations that has gained, not lost, importance in the nuclear air age. Like any other considerations, such facts do not have absolute or overwhelming importance and they must be weighed against any other considerations when policy decisions are made. The ongoing debate, however, about the value of Lajes or Torrejón is less over the usefulness of the airfields per se than over the price to be paid for them or the leeway their lease allows.

There is doubtless less basic agreement about the content- or even the existence of an ideopolitical interest. Ironically, ideopolitical interests are too frequently stated in

geopolitical terms; in the cold war context, it is rarely a matter of preserving a democracy but of denying a particular, strategically-placed piece of territory to the Communists. More relevantly, Spain and Portugal can also be located among a group of developing- as opposed to developed or underdeveloped- countries with a per capita GNP between \$800 and \$1600, a per capita GNP growth rate over 5% during the past decade, and a recent history of sociopolitical or distributional instability. Such countries are above all Mediterranean- Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Greece; other countries which fulfill one of the economic criteria do not fulfill the other, and therefore do not have the level or rate of economic growth to support the same type of distributional crises. It is during this period of development that divisions in society are exacerbated, as distributional crises throw people back onto primary (vertical, ethnic or regional) identification systems, often combined with incipient secondary (horizontal, class) systems. An important question of long range policy implications is not simply the economic one, whether such societies will continue to develop, but above all its political corollary, whether such development can be accomplished under a system of political pluralism or whether

it requires the forced stability (and instability) of military control. Since all of this group of countries has undergone its local variant of military control, the question rephrased becomes, whether military control will be perpetuated as a series of reactions to the previous regime's advent and overthrow, or whether political pluralism and competition can be begun and sustained.

Although GNP is too gross an aggregate to provide a precise indicator of economic development, and per capita GNP obscures the state of distribution, a general trend in the political role of the military can be identified in relation to broad levels of economic development. In the lower levels of development, the military intervention tends to be conservative, relying on the primary military value of order and seeking to restore efficiency to government. At the upper levels, the military also tends toward conservatism, responding again to calls for order and representing a more established part of society. But in the middle levels, there is a greater tendency for the military to be radical, operating for change and progress and representing rapidly mobile or dissatisfied sectors of society.

Despite some of the above general comments or references to Iberia, it would be an error to consider Spain and Portugal to be undergoing the same sort of experience. Despite

some similarities in the fascist history, Spain after Franco is not simply following the path of Portugal after Salazar (even though it is correct to date the beginning of Portuguese change from Salazar's death rather than Caetano's overthrow). In Portugal, radicalization of the military, through changes in its social composition and the political lessons it drew from its military experiences, turned the agents of government into its opposition and brought about the reversal in the political system that allowed the participation of outlawed political groups. In Spain, no such military revolt can, at the moment, be foreseen. It appears unlikely that the military will combine with opposition groups or will become the opposition itself, as in Portugal. Spain, at present, lacks a catalyzing experience such as Portugal's colonial war that would radicalize the military, for the Spanish military is currently a conservative force and likely to remain so unless there is social dissatisfaction in the lower echelons of which we are now unaware. Spanish social dissatisfaction has borne in the recent past on the position of national minorities more than on horizontal divisions. Despite north-south differences in development, no such minorities problem exists in Portugal. In Spain, its polarizing tendencies continue to endanger attempts

at resolution and over time can divide the country politically on the law-and-order issue; the army is unlikely to be divided on this matter. In Portugal the army is divided, despite its leading role as a **radical** vanguard. As time goes on, less radicalized officers swept along by the initial movement begin to rediscover their original views, their disappointment with results obtained, and their new possibilities for expressing their position. Moreover, the very fact of its leading role increases the pressure on the military of all tendencies for responsibility, action and direction; it becomes more and more difficult to retreat into the guardian role, but more and more difficult to act as a decisive, united political force.

Thus the similarity of two countries in transition from totalitarian rule to something else is blurred by important differences. Spain today may be at a "comparable" stage to Portugal shortly after Salazar's death, and it may well have similar perspectives in view as part of its evolution, but to expect it to follow a similar course on the basis of similar political forces would be wrong. In Spain, the current regime seems to have a good deal more support than did the Caetano government in Portugal, and the level of development in Spain (as indicated by the



per capita GNP, for example) is nearly twice as high as in Portugal. These indicators are important, since they could mean that the "center" in Spain is substantially to the right of that in Portugal and the degree of polarized support may be greater in Portugal. The Spanish middle appears to favor a continued emphasis on order at the expense of change; furthermore, in the recent past, moves to the left in Portugal have elicited a reaction to the right in Spain. The relative fates of the right and left in both countries depend on the tolerance for disorder and the desire for liberty of expression and redistributive change.

## II

Human events obviously do not come in neat packages; they have no ends and no beginnings, and any number of trends, phases, and games are going on at the same time. Yet analysis requires some order in these events, so that policy can deal with them. These truisms are stated to attempt to foreclose useless debate on whether analytical trends, stages, and sides are real and identifiable or not, since they must be used.

In Portugal in 1975, the battle was over Communist takeover, and it was won by the pluralist non-Communist

forces. It is not clear how much American foreign policy had to do with that outcome. It is not unreasonable to suggest that some elements helped in a small way, and others do not appear to have hindered. It does seem unreasonable, however, to charge that American policy did not follow a firm, straight, single line, or to make a big thing of the contrast between "optimistic" and "pessimistic" strains of American foreign policy, or to harp on the necessarily leftward movements in Portugal. Straight lines are artificial, and are particularly inappropriate in face of the complexity and uncertainty that accompanies the breakdown of internal order in any political system. Policymakers may have been fearsome or sanguine when confronting such vagaries, but it is not clear how the battle will turn out until one has read the accounts, particularly when histories of similar battles in the past are not encouraging: Communist takeover in 1975 was conceivable, possible, and attempted, even though the military attempts of Amadora (August) and Tancos (November) and the political ascendancy of Carvalho (August-September) were not very well executed, and commentators weaken their analysis by ignoring this potentiality. Among policymakers, the difference between pessimism and optimism would be meaningful only if it referred to a

difference between a self-proving hypothesis of defeat or a self-inhibiting assumption of victory, on one hand, as opposed to an active, alert policy concern on another. Finally, to say that events in Portugal are moving left is almost a truism considering where those events began. But it does not help much in distinguishing among the many groups left of center, and specifically it clouds the old distinction between the pluralist (or democratic) left and the monopolist left. There is no "danger" of a Socialist takeover, there was a "danger" of a Communist takeover.

Szulc, who despite some problems of interpretation alluded to above has written the best account of most of the events and policy reactions of 1975 in his Foreign Policy article, has provided a distinction among three policy types, which can be retained for discussion purposes (even if they are viewed somewhat differently than in the original article). In fact, all three policies have been used, with some possible effect, and a review of them gives the occasion to discuss further the possibilities of policy in influencing domestic events. Intervention will be used with its common connotation of negative influence or interference, against the policy or composition of the existing government. There is no evidence of any American involve-

ment in any of the overthrow attempts of 1975, whether carried out (as the March Spínola attempt) or merely mooted (although no count of these is possible). No evidence has yet been revealed about the disbursement of funds. It is hard for a layman to imagine what else the CIA could do. On the softer fringes of intervention, however, such actions as the spate of statements by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger at the time of the March NATO meeting, concerning the need to examine Portuguese participation in the Organization, hopefully should not be considered idle musings, and were certainly not without effect. As a signal to Russia of the limits of Washington's tolerance, it gave rise to a Soviet response from Ambassador Kalinin indicating a respect for these limits, in a language that seems to be typical of Soviet-American communications under "détente," whatever the problems of sincerity of interpretation may be. As a signal to the moderates in Lisbon, the statements eventually encouraged such an important stand as the Manifesto of the Nine, in August. As a signal to the government, the statements led to the skillfully careful policy followed by Portugal within NATO itself. One may well ask whether the threat of isolation was an appropriate form of intervention in the face of a Communist takeover; the answer seems that there was

no better form available and that the threat was intended as a signal, not as a prediction.

Isolation was the policy threatened but it was also the policy practiced by America and Portugal alike in regard to NATO. In NATO, it was a pragmatic and inventive response to an uncertain situation, one that avoided burning bridges on the part of either party, although of course it was a policy of limited ad hoc isolation, not a total policy (which would have been complete bridge-burning). But isolation as a total policy is a write-off and an abdication, completely unjustified by events to date or foreseeable. It was a reasonable policy toward Spain after World War II because Fascist Spain could be isolated in many regards; it would be ineffective and counterproductive toward a revolutionary Portugal. Isolation seems to have been mooted as a way of communication rather than practiced during 1975, and as such cannot be claimed to have contributed to the course of events of that year.

Support is a trickier matter, for it frequently has been used to mean right-thinking, "understanding," and permissive approval of whatever happens; as such it is the antithesis of policy. "Understanding" is an appropriate stance for any observer- including superpowers- before many events in the world, and the basis- but not the substi-

tute- for policy where policy is required. Since this discussion is an examination of possible courses of action on the basis of understanding, "support" will refer here to a policy of positive influence or intervention, in favor of the policy or composition of the existing government. Support is a Pavlovian process of encouraging another's moves in the "right direction" and overtly providing resources when possible to strengthen friendly governments; it is the essence of active friendly relations among states and frequently practiced. Unless practiced reciprocally, however, which is unusual, it does reflect a condition of power imbalance: Portugal is unlikely to adopt a policy of support vis-à-vis the United States. Support, as a policy, works only where there is something to support, a government composed of political forces with a domestic base and a sense of direction. Support is a policy that works above all with those who can first help themselves.

It is obviously difficult to be precise. In June, the United States agreed to provide \$13.2 million in direct aid for low-cost housing, plus guarantees for \$20 million in private bank /loans for the same purpose. More aid was promised during the latter part of the year. This is terribly little, scarcely a deep manifestation of confidence and

encouragement for a progressive regime with a disturbed economy. In September, the United States confirmed that a somewhat larger sum was being provided by the CIA to the Portuguese Socialist Party. Presumably the money was useful in helping the party establish its primacy in the elections of April and thereafter, although it would be absurd to claim that the party won because of the money. How much of the favorable turn of events of 1975 was encouraged by a third element of support- public statements and private conversations by American officials- is impossible to know, although again any effect is likely to be additive rather than causative. Thus, manifestations of a policy of support have taken varied form in varied quantities; in many cases, even the input is hard to ascertain and the causative relation is impossible to establish. At best it can be said that a favorable outcome was obtained at the end of the 1975 balance sheet, on one hand, and that more overt means of support were put to a very limited use, on the other.

The other way of evaluating the effects of American policy on the political evolution of 1975 is to turn the question around and enumerate the turning points of that evolution to see if crucial American policy effects can be identified. The initial and probably the most important of all the

events of the year was the decision to hold the elections of April. The results of those elections, once held, were equally important. All is conjecture, but it is not unlikely that diplomatic pressure- including that of the United States- was instrumental in maintaining the decision and that foreign funds- including those of the United States- were helpful in the results. The second composite event involves the abortive coup of the right in March and that of the left in August, roughly demarcating the period of the fourth, Goncalves government (April-August). This was certainly the period of the worst relations between the two governments, although it was also the time when the small amount of aid was granted by Washington; it was a time of policy differences between Secretary Kissinger and Ambassador Carlucci. It was also the period when the third crucial event, the Manifesto of the Nine, was in preparation. There is no direct evidence of any American role in this move, which led to the replacement of the fifth, Goncalves government formed at the same time. But two elements were present behind its publication: assurance by the nine authors and subsequent adherents that they were being supported by their own military units against whatever disciplinary action was envisaged, and an internal conviction of the importance of their move and the chances of its success. There is



probably little that American policy could do to enhance the first, but the normal diplomatic contacts and general political statements of the American and European governments can provide real encouragement for the second.

In sum, parts of all three policies- intervention, isolation and support- appear to have been used during 1975. Such diversity was appropriate, since the nature of the government was unclear during that year. Over the period, Portuguese forces of pluralism were able to reorient the revolution in their direction and avoid its monopolization by a single political force. Toward these events, in the balance, American foreign policy was far more supportive than interventionist, although its support could have been more developed.

### III

In Portugal, in 1976, the battle is between pluralistic revolutionary forces, lying left of center and including mainly the political parties but also military groups, and right wing counterrevolutionary military forces. The battle is clearly not yet won, and in fact has scarcely been fought as yet. It is one where the same policy choices are available, where the sides, parties, and trends are

likely to be as complex and uncertain as during 1975, and where the fate of the revolution is at stake.

1976 began with the same event that ended 1975, with the attempted coup of Tancos on 25 November 1975. Despite inconclusive evidence, the report of the Council of the Revolution of 19 January 1976 implicated the Communist Party in the incident and with it Gen. Otelio Saraiva de Carvalho, who until four days before the attempt had been commander of the Continental Operations Command (COPCOM) (military security) and whose units had taken part in the coup. The arrest of Carvalho following the publication of the report may be seen as a further victory for the Nine, whose spokesman, Gen. Vasco Lourenco, replaced Carvalho as commander of the Lisbon military region. But it was also a victory for a larger group of less well known officers who are troubled by any leftist movement, including the Nine and their leader, Cdt. Milo Antunes. Many observers, starting with Carvalho and Antunes themselves, fear an elimination of the military left and then of the civilian left- PCP and then PSP, which has refused to govern without the Communists- leaving in power a military right. In the past, despite some efforts, the two military groups have never been able to work closely together: the Manifesto of the Nine itself was followed

by another statement by the Carvalho group, favoring a type of left wing corporativist government based on soviets and free of the "bourgeois democratic" parties and elections espoused by the Nine. On the civilian side, however, the PSP and the PCP have adopted a more cooperative attitude toward each other, emphasizing social programs and protesting the attacks against party installations in the north.

The very social and economic aspects of the political situation, however, create further problems and dangers for the course of the revolution and for pluralistic politics. Like any revolution, the Portuguese movement of 1974 was in large part distributive, for wealth was unequally possessed and poverty widespread. Like any redistributive movement, the events of 1974-75 achieved greater equality but caused a heavy drop in productivity. In 1976, income is expected to drop by 18% and capital investment by 140%, while unemployment is expected to rise to 15% and inflation to 40%. Increases in wages, inflation, and the takeover of land and industry have been financed for the first two years out of the \$2 billion foreign exchange reserves on hand at the time of the revolution, and since early January 1976 by the sale of gold reserves. A frequent pattern of revolutionary movements shows an accelerated rise in de-

mands for redistribution and equalization, accompanied by a decrease in the available resources to distribute; the rising social unrest which ensues provokes the imposition of a system of political control, either from the left (sympathetic to continued redistribution) or from the right. After the moment of initial takeover, this is the most difficult passage of a revolution and it determines the nature of politics into the future.

As the campaign builds up for the legislative elections, scheduled for the second anniversary of the revolution, the issues of a political structure are moving toward a settlement within the framework of a constitution that provides a role for both the military and the parties. The "soviet"-type organization, the "Alliance of the People and the Armed Forces Movement," which would have bypassed the parties and provided no means of aggregating demands into political programs, appears to have been set aside with the arrest of Carvalho.

But it is the socioeconomic issues which provide the main sources of pressure on the government: peasant unrest against the Communist-controlled land reform program and against inflation, labor unrest against the government's wage freeze and other anti-inflationary measures. Socioeconomic issues become order and security issues, as dissatis-

faction and political competition intensify. Since November, the left wing military has been weakened as a political and security force; the right has thereby been strengthened, and is in a better position to respond forcibly to matters of disorder and insecurity, first against the manifestations themselves but then against their authors. It may of course be possible gradually to restore conditions of security and civil order- including an end to the rising attacks on PCP and other leftist buildings and officials- and thereby establish conditions for productive policy debate, channeling energies into discussion rather than the elimination of participants. But it is also possible that continued conditions of disorder serve as the cause for the deliberate imposition of order and the destruction of Portuguese political pluralism, a domestic Chilean situation.

As a foreign policy approach, both isolation and intervention are likely to favor a Chilean turn of events. Indeed, little intervention may be needed; intervention, like support, needs willing hands, and the analysis has shown these to be increasingly available. But a Chilean solution is not a program for Portugal's problems. At best, it provides a control for the symptoms but not a cure for the causes of Portugal's ills at this stage of its evolution.

For a revolution to pass through the distributive crisis, it needs two ingredients: a temporary source of resources to meet the exploding demands and an inspired leadership that can restore productivity to the newly reallocated enterprises. In terms of foreign policy, this means an external source of support for an effective domestic government. Support in this case might consist of measures to encourage investment and to help companies- such as Timex- already located in Portugal to maintain their operations during the present unsettled conditions, commercial credits to facilitate trade, perhaps loans to cover the purchase of machinery for agricultural cooperatives, direct aid to the government to help it stabilize its economic position without its having to liquidate its reserves and many other such measures to assist the government in combatting unemployment and restoring productivity. American foreign policy in such situations has frequently been geared to the restoration of order and to the installation of conservative economic principles; in this case, support is needed for economic restructuring and for continued functioning until the restructured economy can regain its former output, for a policy of full employment rather than one eliminating inflation.

Politically, the measures are less clear but the goal is:

not: Portugal should be encouraged to maintain pluralistic, competitive political structures and to avoid the temptations of monopoly control of politics from either the right or the left. This means that the political system should continue to include both the army (right as well as left factions) and the Communists, not out of any exclusive sympathy for Carvalho or Cunhal but for at least three different reasons: such forces are better in the political system than outside; they keep the rest of the forces honest with their competition (and also provide a bit of insurance for the PSP, who now finds itself with an enemy on the left); they sometimes have some good ideas (such as the PCP role in agrarian reform). Indeed, this is not an argument for Carvalho or Cunhal but simply a brief for keeping them within the political system. The means toward this policy are not as varied or as tangible: they may again be limited simply to private conversation and public declaration. They do imply, however, a diplomatic mission that talks and listens to someone besides the Foreign Ministry and that, whoever the operatives, has a good intelligence-gathering capability.

Portugal has already shown some significant accomplishments in the history of revolution. It has arrested a leftward drift before it reached the extremes and without losing

the essence of momentum and change that the revolution was designed to bring about. The history of most revolutions shows that at such times the moderates lose heart and strength and the revolution proceeds on its path of destruction, often provoking a succession of terror and totalitarian order before normalcy and evolutionary progress can succeed. Portugal has shown that a dictatorship of the left is not necessary to overthrow a dictatorship of the right. It would be harmful to the image of NATO, the hopes of Western democracy, the well-being of the Portuguese people, and the interests of American policy if the check of the leftward swing of the political pendulum gave momentum to a rightward swing. It would be helpful to those values if the moderation of the swing could create favorable conditions for renewed economic growth and political pluralism, and the lesson of that evolution- and of American policy support behind it- would provide a salutary pressure and example for neighboring Spain. The United States has a subtle but active role in this evolution. It cannot cause it; it can encourage and support it. This role is different from that advocated by the passivists, who would favor only understanding of whatever happens, and the negative activists, who want to unmake the world in their image.



NATO, PORTUGAL, SPAIN -- IBERIAN  
STRATEGIC AND DEFENSE ISSUES

Tad Szulc

The United States and Spain agreed on January 24, 1976, on a new five-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, extending until 1981 our access to Spanish air and naval facilities. Signed two months after the death of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, the agreement may well open the door to Spain's inclusion in the broader system of Western defense arrangements under the umbrella of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As long as Franco lived, Spain's membership in NATO (and in the European Common Market) was anathema to Europeans to whom the old Generalissimo remained a symbol of the wartime Axis. But it is no longer so; Spain's political isolation is ending. The question, then, becomes the extent to which Spain may now play a meaningful role in the NATO context, in addition to its military bilateral ties with the United States.

In Portugal, the concern over a possible Communist or extreme leftist takeover- and, therefore, over a Portuguese alienation from NATO to which it has belonged since its founding in 1949- has been allayed by the events of November, 1975, when the Lisbon government succeeded in putting down

a radical rebellion in the armed forces. However, the last word may not yet have been said in Portugal, and surprises cannot be excluded in that volatile situation.

Thus under the present circumstances, the Iberian peninsula remains a functioning part of the Western defense mechanism, and the political change in Spain may contribute to a strengthening of the NATO system in southwestern Europe.

But having set forth these basic current facts about Iberia, let us examine the validity of the general proposition that Spain and Portugal are- or are not- truly essential to the Western defense structure. This question transcends the immediate advantages now offered by the Peninsula, and it relates to the long-range value of the economic and strategic investment by the United States and the West in Spain and Portugal in terms of significant returns for joint defense.

The money, of course, is relatively insignificant in both cases. Under the new treaty, Spain is to receive \$1.22 billion in military and other credits over the five-year period; this works out to \$244 million annually, roughly one-fifth of one percent of the United States military budget in fiscal year 1977. As to Portugal, Washington agreed in 1971 to pay the Portuguese for the first time

since the original accord was signed in 1947 for the use of an air base in the Azores. A \$400 million package was put together (the Azores are not a NATO operation, but a bilateral arrangement with the United States), but the Portuguese never drew on these credits. The 1971 agreement has expired, and, presumably, a new one will be negotiated in the course of this year -- if Portuguese politics do not take another adverse turn. Considering the depth of Portugal's economic crisis, it is assumed in Washington that a new Azores deal will include substantial financial aid to Lisbon; still, as military expenditures go, the figure is unlikely to be overwhelmingly large.

What is relevant, therefore, is the strategic assessment of the Iberian peninsula in the light of changing military technology, new warfare doctrines, and political considerations.

Iberia, however, cannot be discussed as a single strategic and political problem even though the Peninsula, as noted above, functions as part of the overall Western defense mechanism. Such are the structural, strategic and political peculiarities of Spain and Portugal that a separate look is required at each of them.

SPAIN

Since 1954, when the first bases' agreement was signed, the United States has been operating on a "joint" basis with the Spaniards a series of major military installations. At a cost of several billion dollars (then a much-needed contribution to the tottering Spanish economy), air bases were built at Torrejón, near Madrid; Saragossa in the northeast; Morón, near Sevilla; and San Pablo, also in the Sevilla area. A base for nuclear submarines was built at Rota on the southwestern Atlantic coast; Rota likewise has its own naval air station. A pipeline to carry fuel from the Sevilla-Rota area to Torrejón and Saragossa was simultaneously laid across Spain. Classified intelligence-gathering facilities were established along the Mediterranean coast, notably in the Alicante region.

The decision to obtain bases in Spain was a direct outgrowth of the Korean War. A number of concepts were involved in this decision. In terms of European defense, Spain was regarded as a rearguard staging area where aircraft and munitions could be stored in support of Allied armies that might be fighting the Soviet Union in Central Europe. Some strategists even thought of Spain as a fall-back area. That Spain was not a NATO member did not, in realistic terms, detract from this concept: such political considerations

would, presumably, become inoperative in a major war. Until the mid-1960's, American strategic bombers along with fighters were stationed at the Spanish bases.

The bombers were removed when the Pentagon concluded that with the emergence of the long-range B-52 plane, the Spanish bases would be more useful for the refueling in the air of these bombers flying airborne alert missions close to Soviet borders. The nuclear-armed B-52's flew from bases in the eastern United States to be refueled over Spain by aerial tankers coming up from Morón, Torrejón and Saragossa on their eastward runs and, again, enroute home from airborne-alert stations.

Spanish air bases also served as transit points for American aircraft flying to Western Europe, Turkey, and even Vietnam, and back. Care was exercised, however, that no flights going through Spain were NATO-earmarked. Excluded from NATO, the Spaniards made a point of it. In reality, of course, this was something of a fiction inasmuch as American planes using Spanish facilities could, so to speak, change their missions in mid-air. By the same token, military aircraft from NATO countries were cleared to land at joint Spanish-American bases under their individual national colors rather than as NATO planes.

From a strategic naval viewpoint, Rota was considered essential to support the operations of nuclear Polaris and, later, Poseidon submarines. Rota was one of two overseas bases for nuclear submarines, the other one being in Scotland. Nuclear warheads were stored at Rota, which was also used for crew rotations; fresh crews were flown from the United States to Rota to take over the boats while crews returning from their long missions were sent home from there. In part because Spain was not a NATO member, no thought was ever given to the establishment of home-porting facilities on Spanish territory for the Sixth Fleet. However, Spanish ports such as Barcelona were available for frequent visits by American warships, mainly for crew "rest and recreation" purposes. Inasmuch as the Sixth Fleet receives all its supplies at sea, there was no need to use Spanish ports logistically.

Finally, the American military presence in Spain played a major role in the modernization of Spanish armed forces. Equipment and training were provided under succeeding bases' agreements. U.S. Marines practiced landings on the Mediterranean coast, sometimes in conjunction with Spanish forces. Paratroopers had maneuvers in the North. U.S. Army Special Forces teams held exercises in the Pyrenees. Spanish and French units conducted joint training operations, as did the

Spanish and French navies. Both countries were outside the NATO military structure, but, broadly speaking, the Spaniards were in various ways developing capabilities for integrated operations in terms of Western defenses.

When time came to renegotiate the Spanish bases' agreements in the late 1960s and then the 1970s, the question inevitably arose as to whether the United States needed to maintain all its bases in Spain. Military technology was rapidly improving, and the United States armed forces were less and less dependent on the Spanish facilities. Besides, the Spaniards were placing restrictions on the use of the bases. Because of Spain's political closeness to the Arab countries, Madrid informed the United States during the 1967 Middle East war -- and again in 1973 -- that the joint bases could not be used for military supply flights to Israel. In fact, the Spaniards were even reluctant to let American aircraft en-route to Israel overfly Spanish territory. To be sure, the Spaniards looked the other way in both 1967 and 1973, when American planes flying to Israel were being refueled by aerial tankers based in Morón<sup>and</sup>/Torrejón, but this was not a satisfactory arrangement.

The accident in January, 1966, when a B-52 and an aerial tanker collided over Spain with the loss of four hydrogen bombs on Spanish territory and in Spanish waters, led the

Spaniards to rethink the wisdom of allowing the United States to keep conducting nuclear operations. Since 1966, the United States has had to halt flights of aircraft carrying nuclear weapons over Spain. In the negotiations leading to the 1976 Treaty, Spain insisted on being "denuclearized;" she no longer wanted nuclear warheads to be stored at Rota on the grounds that such storage made her vulnerable to a possible Soviet pre-emptive strike. Accordingly, Washington agreed in the 1976 pact to remove the nuclear warheads from Rota. Furthermore, the new agreement provided for the removal of Poseidon submarines from the base not later than 1979.

Is it, therefore, worth it to the United States to maintain all the joint bases in Spain? The Ford Administration's decision was obviously in the affirmative inasmuch as it did sign the January renewal treaty. Military as well as political considerations entered this decision although some of them may be arguable.

Militarily, the rationale was rather simple: it was the general notion, not alien to the military mind, that it is better to have bases wherever possible rather than not to have them. More specifically, the Navy felt that Rota remained vital for the nuclear submarine fleet- at least until the Trident generation of boats becomes operational-



even if nuclear warheads could no longer be stored there.

The Air Force also saw continuing advantages.

Thus it was argued that the stationing of aerial tankers in Spain was still essential to support a variety of United States military air traffic in southwestern Europe and the western Mediterranean. It was desired to maintain tactical air units in Spain for in-depth defense purposes in the case of a European war. With France out of the NATO military system, there was only Spain to support in the South operations conducted from advanced bases in West Germany, Britain and northern NATO countries. There was also the thought that, sooner or later, Spain would be allowed to join NATO, thus formally integrating it into the Western system. Another consideration related to Saragossa. Since the United States was forced to close down its air base in Wheelus, Libya, in the 1960's, American pilots had no access to training ranges in uncongested air space anywhere in European and North African regions. Saragossa, however, provided an alternative: training flights from there could be directed over the Mediterranean and the Atlantic as well as over designated stretches of Spanish territory. Moreover, Pentagon planners were taking into account the possibility that Spain would eventually become a NATO member; Saragossa would then be available to other NATO air forces.

Basically, the 1976 Treaty maintains the status quo in terms of Spanish bases (San Pablo, a minor facility, was deactivated in the 1960's) except for the "denuclearization" provisions. There are, of course, officials in the Administration who argued- before being overruled- that all the military considerations invoked for the maintenance of this status quo were less than convincing. This was the faction that, as a matter of principle, would prefer to see a diminished American military presence abroad. The final decision, favored by the Pentagon as well as by Secretary Kissinger, thus became in the end a matter of executive judgement.

Politically, this judgement included the view that it was easier to negotiate a bases agreement with Spain now rather than later- when the character of Spanish politics may have changed in the wake of Franco's death. Negotiators felt that a broad bases agreement should be nailed down as soon as possible- the previous agreement had expired in September, 1975- on the theory that even a more narrow pact might prove to be difficult in the future. Spain, of course, can denounce the Treaty at any time she wishes under the termination-notice clause- as can the United States.

This view was held firmly in Washington even before Franco's death; Kissinger and the Spanish foreign minister, in fact, initialled a "framework" agreement while the Generalissimo

still lived. It was believed that Franco desperately needed the renewal for internal political reasons and that, therefore, better terms could be obtained.

The new government of King Juan Carlos I turned out to be just as anxious for a new bases agreement. Jose Maria Areilza, the new foreign minister, considered that a pact with the United States would strengthen Spain's political position in the world at the time when she was seeking new acceptance in Western Europe following Franco's death. Both Kissinger and Areilza believed that a U.S.-Spanish pact at this time would lead to Spain's membership in NATO, a proposition strongly advocated by Washington.

The main difference between the 1976 Treaty and the past bases' agreements is that the new instrument is a formal treaty, subject to Senate ratification. Past agreements were simple executive agreements although the Congress had to approve funds for Spain. Madrid had long desired a formal treaty relationship, but the State Department assumed, probably correctly, that the Senate would not go along with it as long as Franco lived. As a matter of fact, it was only after Franco's death that the United States decided to negotiate a treaty instead of an executive agreement that was under discussion in 1975. Under the present law, even executive agreements are now subject to Congressional scrutiny

though not to Senate ratification.

The 1976 Treaty does not carry mutual security provisions- the United States, in other words, is not obligated to go automatically to the defense of Spain as, for example, is the case with mutual security treaties with Japan or South Korea. But as a Treaty, the new accord grants Spain respectability she lacked internationally during the isolation of the long Franco period. Spain had wanted this type of recognition for a long time.

It is now up to the Senate to act on the Spanish Treaty. There is no ~~known~~<sup>/strong/</sup> opposition at this time to ratification, and, all things being equal, the Treaty should be ratified before too long. The agreement with the United States is not at the present time an issue with democratic groups in Spain; not even the Communists have taken positions against it. For this reason, there is no need for Senate liberals to look at the Treaty with hostility so long as the United States undertakes no direct defense responsibility for Spain. Once Spain joins NATO, of course, she becomes part of the alliance's system of mutual security.

The argument that Spain must become more liberalized before the United States enters into a Treaty relationship with her is not really tenable at this point. The same consideration applies to Western European sentiments concerning Spain's

NATO membership. The Europeans, in fact, are quite receptive toward new Spain and are prepared to give the King's government considerable latitude in solving his domestic problems. It would, therefore, not serve the United States to be purer ideologically toward Spain than is the case with the Europeans. NATO, having tolerated dictatorial Portugal and dictatorial Greece in its midst for so many years, would be less than consistent in blocking the Spanish membership in NATO and the Common Market for an indefinite period- now that Franco, the symbol of the evil past, is gone.

Now that the United States has made the decision to offer Spain a formal Treaty, nothing is to be gained from a Senate refusal or delay in ratification. Military reasons, as noted above, may be arguable, but a strong political case can be made for the Treaty in terms of helping Spain's incorporation into the democratic NATO community. In terms of overall Western defense, Spain's participation in NATO would make the Organization more coherent militarily, which, presumably, is all to the good at this time of the tottering détente with the Soviet Union.

But there are still problems ahead to be solved. Perhaps the most important of them is the Spanish-British dispute over Gibraltar. Spain has been campaigning for years to obtain the return of the Rock she lost early in the eighteenth

century. Britain has been adamant in its refusal to give up the tiny Crown Colony. Yet, Gibraltar is a vital strategic area, sitting astride the straits that divide Europe from North Africa. Some form of British-Spanish military cooperation in Gibraltar is essential if Spain is to be fully integrated in NATO. Algeciras Bay, controlled by Spain except for the waters adjacent to the Rock, is a superb natural harbor that NATO fleets should be able to use. The same reasoning applies to the Gibraltar air strip. The harbor is available to American warships, but not to the British Navy. In a Nato context, Gibraltar and Algeciras Bay should be part of the broader defense complex. This would be especially true if NATO should decide some day, as it may, to extend its interests to the South Atlantic and African coasts- past its present Tropic of Capricorn southernmost limit. The first step in this direction was taken by NATO in the Ottawa Declaration in 1974, providing that the allies may consult on matters beyond the actual NATO framework. Recent events in Angola and elsewhere in Western Africa may accelerate this trend. And with Spain's membership in NATO, her naval and air facilities on the Canary Islands would become available to the Alliance.

PORTUGAL

Strategically speaking, Portugal's importance to NATO is of a negative rather than a positive nature. In other words, Portugal- apart from its bilateral arrangement with the United States over the Azores- contributes little to Western defenses despite the Portuguese membership in the Atlantic alliance. However, the emergence of a hostile, anti-Western regime in Lisbon could deal a blow to NATO if Portugal made military facilities available to the Soviet Union. NATO's concern in Portugal, therefore, is to assure that Portuguese facilities are denied to the other side.

Historically, Portugal's contribution to NATO has been minimal despite her strategic location. There are no NATO installations in Portugal except for the IBERLANT command near Lisbon, essentially a paper command with no forces under its control. IBERLANT is part of SACLANT, the Norfolk-based Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic, but its contribution is negligible even in a planning context.

Portugal's lengthy and debilitating colonial wars prevented her from a workable integration in NATO defenses. There has been an embargo on arms deliveries to Portugal that might have been used in Africa, and, basically, the Portuguese have a rather primitive military establishment in comparison with their NATO allies. Even Spain is consid-

erably more advanced than Portugal in modern military technology.

Portugal has a military treaty with Spain, but it is a purely political arrangement that Franco and Salazar, the late Portuguese dictator, signed many years ago. Spain's entry into NATO and Portugal's disengagement from Africa may, however, create a relatively viable Iberian defense system if the Portuguese rebuild their armed forces. All this, however, depends largely on future political developments in Lisbon. At this stage, the Portuguese have no stomach for new military involvements.

Theoretically, Portugal is in a position to contribute to NATO. An example is the Beja air force base, built by West Germany in the mid-1960's, but subsequently abandoned. The German idea was to use Beja, as the Americans were using Saragossa, for pilot training in open air space. Should Beja ever be fitted into the NATO system, it would supplement the Spanish bases.

Ideally, Spain and Portugal could, under new circumstances, become integrated in-depth defense areas for NATO in the South. But this is unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future for a variety of reasons, including Portuguese political uncertainties. The West is not anxious at this point to invest strategically in Portugal. A pre-condition would



be Portugal's full-fledged involvement in NATO military affairs. Following the 1974 revolution in Portugal and the installation of leftist regimes during 1975, Lisbon voluntarily withdrew from NATO strategic planning structures. She left, for example, the NATO Nuclear Planning Group, a move that her NATO partners greeted with relief. It is unclear at what point Portugal may rejoin the nuclear group. She has also been cut off from the flow of sensitive NATO intelligence, and some time may elapse before the Portuguese regain this trust.

Should Portugal swing back again to a leftist regime, there is nothing NATO can do about the Portuguese membership. The NATO treaty has no provisions for suspending and expelling members; the best it can do is keep Portugal out of its day-to-day activities. It should be noted, however, that even in 1975, when leftists ruled Lisbon, the Portuguese insisted on retaining their NATO membership. Nothing was ever said in Lisbon about leaving NATO and becoming non-aligned. But it should be noted that, paradoxically, even Italian and French Communists oppose their countries' withdrawal from NATO. This may change, of course, if Communists gain positions of power in these two countries.

The Azores are a separate situation. There has never been

a desire on the part of the United States or Portugal to turn the Azores into a NATO base. If and when Washington is able to renegotiate the Azores accord- Americans remain at the Lajes Air Force Base on Terceira Island without a pact and on the basis of a "gentlemen's agreement"- it is unlikely that these mid-Atlantic islands would be fitted into the NATO structure.

It also seems that the value of the Azores to the United States is entering diminishing returns. Even the pre-revolutionary regime took a week in 1973 before authorizing the United States to use Lajes to refuel aircraft flying the supply airlift to Israel during the Yom Kippur war. Post-revolutionary regimes, including the current moderate regime, have been opposed to the use of the Azores in the event of a new Middle Eastern war. Early in 1976, the moderate Portuguese government allowed Cuban aircraft, flying troops to Angola, to refuel at a Portuguese base on Santa Maria Island in the Azores. This practice was stopped as a result of strong United States representations, but it cannot be excluded that similar situations may develop in the future.

A renegotiation of the Azores agreement may, then, pose serious difficulties for the United States in the unsettled Portuguese situation.

In conclusion, the Iberian peninsula remains potentially a highly important region in terms of Western defenses.

Spain's gradual re-entry in the European community is a positive factor in this context. Portugal remains a question mark although the worst dangers may have passed. In short, the Iberian strategic picture offers promise as well as complex problems.

## PORTUGUESE WITHDRAWAL FROM AFRICA, 1974-1975:

## THE ANGOLAN CASE

Douglas L. Wheeler

Moreover, there was the question of the international prestige of Fascism, which for a year or two had been haunting me like a nightmare. Since 1930 the Fascists had won all the victories; it was time they got a beating, and it hardly mattered from whom. If we could drive Franco and his foreign mercenaries into the sea it might make an immense improvement in the world situation, even if Spain itself emerged with a stifling dictatorship and all its best men in jail. For that alone the war would have been worth winning.

- George Orwell, in Homage to Catalonia (1938) p. 182

The felicity of a people cannot, ever, be built upon a heap of cadavers and innocent victims.

- General Silva Cardoso,  
Portuguese High Commissioner  
in Angola, in interview with  
Expresso (Lisbon), May 17, 1975

The (African Nationalist) movements have the duty to assume their responsibility before History.

- Foreign Minister Melo Antunes,  
Luanda, press interview, July 18,  
1975 (Diario Popular, Lisbon,  
July 18, 1975).

The truth is, we are all puppets here, we are as much as are the three (African) movements.

- Admiral Leonel Cardoso, last  
Portuguese High Commissioner  
in Angola, November 9, 1975  
interview, Veja, (Sao Paulo)  
November 19, 1975.

Portugal's post-April 25, 1974 decolonization produced an unusual record: by early summer in 1975 in Asia, Timor was involved in a civil war, and Mainland China evinced no immediate interest in Portugal's offer of independence for Macao; in Africa, Guinea-Bissau (September 10, 1974), Mozambique (June 25, 1975), Cape Verde Islands (July 5, 1975) and Sao Tome, Principe Islands (July 12, 1975) were granted independence, and the imperial prize, Angola, was embroiled in a civil war. Angola became the first country in Africa south of the Sahara to begin independence deeply mired in a bloody internationalized civil war.

This paper will emphasize certain political factors which influenced Portugal's role in Angola during April 1974-November 11, 1975, when the VI Provisional Government, refusing to recognize a legal government, withdrew and handed over sovereignty to "the people of Angola." Why was Portugal unable to contain the African nationalist power struggle in Angola? What links were there between politics in Portugal and the civil conflict in Angola? At what points during 1974-75, during repeated attempts to enforce cease-fires and prevent a civil war, were there "master events," after which it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to alter the course of events? And, finally, in terms of the actions of Portugal, the three rival African nation-

alist parties, and external powers, given the circumstances, what actions might have changed the course of events?

# I

The military situation in Portuguese-speaking Africa as of the April 25, 1974 coup in Lisbon was varied and complex. While a good case can be made to show that in Guinea-Bissau Portuguese forces were losing, and were under severe but relatively new pressures in central Mozambique, the war was not "lost" militarily.<sup>1</sup> Even more clearly, in Angola, where insurgency had existed over the longest period, the war was in a stalemate which was not unfavorable to the Portuguese; large sectors of the east and central parts of the territory supposedly "liberated" by the MPLA, for example, experienced little or no fighting. Civilians foreign to the conflict could travel from one end of the area to the other safely and without incident.<sup>2</sup> Partisan claims to the contrary, no one nationalist group was clearly dominant over even one-third of the vast territory, and the level of their efforts against the Portuguese armed forces varied greatly. Once independence was in sight, after March 1975, the African rival parties, the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA, fought each other with much greater intensity, and at greater cost in lives,

than they had fought the Portuguese during 13 years of ephemeral insurgency.

If the war was not won militarily, the coup in Lisbon changed much. Political factors became paramount. The MPLA intensified its insurgency against the Portuguese forces in Angola in order to make its bid for negotiating a rapid independence with a new regime in Portugal dominated by a left-leaning Armed Forces Movement.<sup>3</sup> Until July 1974 it was not clear if the new Portuguese regime would grant independence, if it would fight on for better terms for settler and economic interests. A power struggle in Lisbon among the Armed Forces Movement leadership, and the newly surfaced Leftist civilian parties, determined the initial course of decolonization.

Between May 14 and late June, numerous pronouncements from President of the Republic Spínola, and several Ministers, led observers to believe that the regime would try to execute Spínola's Lusitanian Federation plan wherein each territory would vote whether or not to remain in a Federation which would guarantee the rights of the Portuguese settlers and give Portugal certain powers in the economic and military fields. Leftist junior officers prevailed as Premier Palma Carlos resigned on July 9-10, when he failed to obtain guarantees for the present or future power of President

Spinola. On July 19, the Government published a law which included independence in the definition of "self-determination,"<sup>4</sup> and it was promised that Guinea-Bissau would be given independence soon. There were to be "stages" of evolution for the independence of Angola and Mozambique, UN official monitoring was to be encouraged by Portugal. By the July 27, 1974 speech of General Spinola, "referendums" among the colonial populations, of all races, were ruled out and independence settlements would henceforth be negotiated with a selected one (or group) of the African nationalist parties involved in the struggle against Portugal.<sup>5</sup> In the Lusaka agreement, signed August 7, 1974, a major step was taken which clarified issues in the conflict between two different concepts of decolonization. By this agreement, the vague language of the MFA program on a "political solution" to the overseas wars was clarified and Mozambique was dealt with. There would be no referendum in Mozambique and only one nationalist group, FRELIMO, would be granted status and major control over the Transitional Government. On June 25, 1975, having withdrawn all her armed forces from eastern Africa, Portugal would grant full independence to Mozambique. On September 10, 1974, Guinea-Bissau achieved independence.



The Angolan problem remained. There were many facets to the problem of decolonizing Angola. First, there were pressures and problems faced in Portugal. The Armed Forces Movement's leadership steadily moved leftward during 1974 and into 1975 and with this tendency came leftist reinforcement of demands for immediate decolonization. As the political parties prepared for elections in 1975 their party congresses and published programs discussed decolonization. The PCP, the Communist Party, and its ally-front, the MDP, strongly emphasized immediate decolonization and they claimed that this program would strengthen Portuguese democracy at home.<sup>6</sup> Radical leftist views prevailed as General Spínola resigned his office as President on September 30 and with him went some possibility of pressures at the top for a partial implementation of his plan for a Lusitanian Federation that might include Angola, with a free referendum, a multi-party system and a more gradual decolonization process with some guarantees for the safety and property of over 350,000 Portuguese settlers.

The turbulent, somewhat confusing and surprising events in Portugal in the months after the April coup have obscured the fact that there were historic as well as current factors which might have supported a more conservative solution to decolonization, and, in particular to the complex

AD-A095 925

DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON DC OFFICE OF EXTERNAL--ETC F/6 5/4  
PROCEEDINGS OF A SERIES OF SEMINARS CONDUCTED IN COOPERATION WI--ETC(U)  
1976 R ROETT

UNCLASSIFIED

FAR-26602

NL

2 of 2

AD-A  
095925




END  
DATE  
FILMED  
4-81  
DTIC

problems of the most valuable colony, Angola. The surface volatility and "noise" of dominant leftist forces, quite well organized political forces, hid the undercurrent of center and rightist opinion on these issues. The size of the settler population and the economic stakes, and the fact that Portugal's economic weakness and dependence precluded such a "neo-colonial" comeback were not the only factors to keep in mind. There was also the fact that the Portuguese public was never given the opportunity to debate the colonial problem freely. Even the Democratic Socialist Party opposition, including the leader Mario Soares,<sup>7</sup> did not publicly bring up the colonial issue in terms of an African-dominated independence for the colonies until the fall 1969 legislative elections allowed under Premier Caetano, when some debate on Africa was allowed.

Moreover, there is evidence that a substantial portion of the Portuguese population, especially those living in central and north Portugal, north of the Tagus, no longer fully subscribed to New State Luso-Tropical colonial rhetoric, but sought to protect distinct interests. Indeed, Premier Caetano shifted his defense of his colonial policy from a defense of the large economic interest and a "historic mission" to the protection of settler's lives and property.<sup>8</sup> The opinion of this important group of

Portuguese, the Angolan settlers, with their connections, families and relatives, in Portugal and Brazil, and further afield in other Portuguese-speaking communities, was an important factor, both under the waning days of the New State, 1968-74, when Caetano "signalled left but turned right," and during the post-dictatorship era. Their opinion, too, must have been partially shared by numbers of black and brown Angolans who joined the thousands of whites as refugees in Portugal during 1975-76.<sup>9</sup>

In a recent article, Kenneth Maxwell suggested that General Spínola's plan, the Lusitanian Federation, was "20 years too late."<sup>10</sup> My view is that there is some chance that such a plan might have been carried out in 1969-70, but it would have been quite difficult to carry out since there was no real preparation for self-government for the Africans or for the Portuguese settlers, and since the political and racial attitudes of the settlers were even less advanced than six years later. Indeed, it would be more realistic to claim the "Lusitanian Federation" was 10 to 20 years "too early." This would have required, of course, a strong but liberal, advanced Portuguese Government in Lisbon, pursuing a gradualist decolonization plan according to a precise schedule. Such a strong government, like that of Great Britain in Northern

Ireland, would have had to be willing to pay a high price in political and economic costs to persevere in a lawful, orderly transition in the face of war and terrorism. The weakening of the New State system, the sudden opening to the Left after April 25, 1974 and the subsequent struggle for power among political groups, both in Africa and in Portugal, precluded any such eventuality.

Negotiations between Portugal and the African nationalist parties of Angola began in earnest in October, 1974, and were slow, tedious and complex. The two strongest and oldest parties, both recognized at one time or another by the OAU, were the MPLA and the FNLA; they maneuvered in order to get the upper hand. An outside force, Zaire, put pressure on Portugal to exclude the MPLA from any settlement and to esconce its client, the FNLA. In Portugal, the radical leftist parties, especially the PCP and its allies, campaigned to have the FNLA excluded from a settlement. MFA moderates, and considerable restraint, prevailed temporarily as the Portuguese and African statesmen managed to get the major nationalist leaders to sit down and negotiate. When serious negotiations proceeded and the meetings were moved to Mombasa in December 1974, a breakthrough was at hand.

By January 5, 1975, the Portuguese had worked out a basic agreement as a foundation for a final settlement. Now three parties were assigned status as the only "legitimate" representatives of the Angolan people: MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA. The addition of UNITA was a relatively last-minute development, and was in the nature of the compromise designed, perhaps, to balance ethnic representation among the parties and to offset the historic enmity between the two older parties. UNITA was "recognized" as a legitimate Angolan political movement by the OAU only two days before the secret decolonization negotiations were moved into their final phase in Portugal on January 10, 1975. At Alvor, Algarve, the so-called Alvor Agreement was negotiated and agreed to by the four signatories. This extraordinary agreement set up an era of transition between colony and independent state. On paper, the Alvor Agreement was a masterpiece of Portuguese and African compromise, carefully calculated balance and diplomacy. Independence was scheduled for November 11, 1975. The parties agree to honor previously negotiated cease-fires, to remain within their own "lines" as they were when the insurgency war ceased, and to cooperate in building an Angolan national army to be composed of Angolans drawn from the guerilla forces of the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA.

Portugal granted power to a Transitional Government which entered office officially on January 31, 1975, in Luanda. In this Transitional Government equal roles were assigned to each of the three nationalist parties, and Portugal would negotiate further with the nationalists on questions such as the rights of Europeans, economic holdings, property transfer and resources.

The Transitional Government consisted of an unusual executive College of three "Presidents," each representing one of the three legal African parties. Until independence, this Presidential College, together with a cabinet with posts distributed equally among the three parties and the key Portuguese representative, the High Commissioner, was to run daily affairs. Three areas of responsibility were delegated to other institutions: foreign affairs would be handled by Portugal, and external defense, and internal security were to be controlled by a "National Defense Committee," which had authority over the Portuguese armed forces, the forces of the parties and the police. This National Defense Committee was clearly a crucial institution and it is worthwhile discussing its composition in greater detail. The Committee consisted of Portugal's chief government representative and, in effect, military commander, the High Commissioner<sup>11</sup> (a term used previously in Portuguese colon-

ial history during the years 1920-31), the Presidential College, and a Unified General Staff. The High Commissioner was Chairman of the body. Missions of the Committee were: to carry out military policy,\* to safeguard the present territory and frontiers of Angola (including the Cabinda enclave), to guarantee peace and security, law and order, and to promote the safety of persons and property.<sup>12</sup>

The Alvor Agreement, finally, called for elections in October, in order to elect a government and design a constitution, an exercise which, in theory, would allow the will of a host of different groups in Angola to be freely and fully expressed.

A bloody civil war broke out beginning with clashes between the FNLA and MPLA in late March, 1975. The machinery of the Alvor Agreement's Transitional Government, including the key National Defense Committee, never worked properly. As the civil war became internationalized, the violence deepened and there were no elections held before the official day of "Independence" was celebrated on November 11, 1975.

\* An important clause of the Alvor Agreement stipulated that Portugal would maintain armed forces in Angola past the agreed-upon independence date, November 11, 1975, until late February, 1976. After independence, Portugal agreed to withdraw troops gradually until all had left by February, 1976. After the civil war continued, and pressures intensified, Portugal accepted the MPLA's demand to evacuate all Portuguese troops by November 11, 1976.



Why was Portugal unable to contain the pressures which eventually exploded into civil war, thus undermining the Alvor Agreement? There were two fundamental areas of concern: authority and security. The Transitional Government was ineffective, and as violence escalated, its authority became nil. Portugal's governmental machinery and armed forces were unable to exercise effective authority. As the violence of the power struggle among the African parties' armed forces and militants increased, no one could guarantee the safety of citizens of any race and insecurity became general.

Which armed forces were involved and to what extent did the military situation become responsible for the breakdown of the Alvor Agreement and the evolution of events into a civil war? The chart below indicates the evolution of the size of the various military forces present. When analyzing this chart the reader should keep in mind the following problems: most of the figures are estimates based upon journalist's reportage, and official figures, for whatever they are worth, are not yet available.<sup>13</sup>

Date	Party	Size of Force	Allies
April 1974	Portugal	70,000	30,000 (African)
	MPLA	10,000?	- a few Eur. mercenaries
	FNLA	10,000?	
	UNITA	2,000?	
Alvor Agreement stipulations, Jan. 15, 1975	Portugal	24,000	<u>note- planned force levels</u>
	MPLA	8,000	
	FNLA	8,000	
	UNITA	8,000	
Actual numbers, as they were, mid-Jan. 1975	Portugal	40,000	Africans: being demobilized
	MPLA	10,000?	?Cubans?
	FNLA	15,000?	
	UNITA	5,000?	1-2,000 Zairoise
July 1, 1975	Portugal	24,000?	
	MPLA	15,000	300-500 Cubans
	FNLA	20,000	1-2000 Zairoise
	UNITA	8,000	
November 1, 1975	Portugal	3-4,000	
	MPLA*	27,000	2-3,000 Cubans
	FNLA	22,000	1-2,000 Zairoise
	UNITA	8-10(?)000	4-5,000 S. Afr.
January 2, 1976	Portugal	----	
	MPLA**	27,000	8-10,000 Cubans
	FNLA	21,000	2,000 Zairois,
	UNITA	9-12,000	Port. Merc.
			4-5,000 S. Afr., white merc.

\* Le Monde (Nov. 12-13, 1975) reported that Mozambique dispatched 250 FRELIMO troops to the MPLA.

\*\* Plus the 27,000 regular troops, MPLA apparently had in support of its war effort, 12,000 "part-time" guerilla tribesmen, plus 6,000 pro-MPLA former Katanga mercenaries who opposed Pres. Mobutu's regime in Zaire. Estimates of Soviet advisors on MPLA's side range from 200 to 2,000. See Christian Science Monitor, (Feb. 18, 1976; Jan. 2, 1976).

The chart above does not take into account the following armed militants who backed the various rival parties and who were in Angola at various times beginning in late January 1975. Backing the MPLA were: Portuguese leftists, some military, some civilian; Europeans from East European bloc countries; possibly some Brazilian "advisors;" other groups who backed the FNLA and/or UNITA included paid mercenaries: anti-Castro Cubans and Americans recruited in Florida, California, Colorado, as well as French, British, Belgian and South African citizens. In terms of numbers of foreign mercenaries, whatever their motives for being in Angola, the MPLA usually had more mercenaries than those fighting for its two rivals.<sup>14</sup>

While the Transitional Government frequently broke down, in part because of the tripartite structure which seemed to preclude the exercise of power by one executive, the military situation worsened steadily. The power struggle involved an outbreak of fighting first among soldiers of the MPLA and FNLA in early March, at a training camp north of Mocamedes. This was followed by a week of intense fighting between troops of the MPLA and FNLA during March 22-28, in and around the capital of Luanda. Evidence available points to a provocation by FNLA troops in the murder or execution of 51-60 MPLA troops; by March 28 a fragile truce was established in Luanda, but only after the death of several hundred, and the armed attacks

by MPLA militant civilians, some armed with catanas (Angolan machetes) in the Luanda African townships.<sup>15</sup> The Portuguese High Commissioner and his forces enforced curfews, patrols with mixed forces, and the confinement to barracks of the feuding troops units. But the March bloodbath was only the beginning of a spiralling, if ephemeral set of battles in Luanda and in major towns in northern Angola, including Caxito, Malanje, and Carmora. Following the "Holy Week" shooting, the possibility of a peaceful, constitutional transition to independence was further undermined by three separate, devastating bursts of war: April 28-May 3, early June and, finally, what might properly be termed, "The Battle of Luanda," July 9-15.

The effect of the FNLA-MPLA killings of early spring seemed to loose a dam full of the pent-up hatreds, fears, blood feud memories, and mob-like instincts in the Luanda African shantytowns (os muceques) in the greater Luanda area and eastward on a line to Malanje. Each wave of violence began with an incident, but there is strong evidence that the first three bursts of civil war between the FNLA and the MPLA were provoked, perhaps deliberately, by the FNLA to defeat the MPLA in its ethnic-regional base area.<sup>16</sup> A major object of the FNLA seems to have been to win over the Mbundu-dominated population of the Luanda-muceques and

to drive out the MPLA forces from Mbundu-dominated towns east and north of Luanda.

The price of the breakdown of civil order was appalling: by July 10, probably 40,000 dead and twice that number in injured among the African population. "Cease-fires" were invariably arranged after each burst of mayhem. At least until June, the Portuguese armed forces, shaken by war-weariness, fear, and the desire to leave Angola, were able to act as mediators between the feuding MPLA and FNLA armed forces; but they were unable to prevent the killings, end the atmosphere of excessive tension, fear and insecurity, or to construct an effective, sizeable Angolan national army. There were serious repercussions on society in north-east Angola. With work stoppages and strikes by African workers in industry, the ports and in farming, the economy became paralyzed. Among the other effects were: severe scarcity of food, breakdown of services, ~~famine~~-like conditions in rural areas, hopelessly inadequate, besieged medical resources, and a massive displacement of populations. Ethnic groups, feeling insecure where they were, fled to new areas or left Angola. Most of the Portuguese population began to flee by air, ship, on foot, and some went in convoys of cars and trucks overland to Namibia.<sup>17</sup> Even larger and more significant, perhaps, was the displacement of African populations from towns and rural areas in northern Angola

as the fighting escalated. Thousands of Africans from Luanda fled to the south, if they were Ovimbundu, to the north if they were Bakongo. The population displacement in the Luanda area, in effect, helped to assure a greater MPLA dominance. By June, society in north-east Angola was gripped by wartime conditions; it is indicative of this that the International Red Cross had already established emergency medical teams in sections of Angola by June.<sup>18</sup>

The principal factors, all interrelated, which prevented the Portuguese government from enforcing the Alvor Agreement, or even from honoring all its stipulations, were found in the Portuguese military situation, in the African nationalist parties' forces and in external intervention.

The most serious failure of the Portuguese armed forces was their inability to disarm various African civilian and military groups, to build a national Angolan army, and to prevent the MPLA "coup" of July 9-15, when the MPLA forces drove out the FNLA from their Luanda installations and conquered the city. The Portuguese armed forces were at a serious disadvantage in areas outside of Luanda since they lacked the numbers, and perhaps the equipment, to enforce the peace. The last Portuguese High Commissioner stated that the "basic error" was to "fix" Portuguese armed strength at 24,000 when the three African parties

maintained and increased their forces (the UNITA group may be an exception) well beyond the stipulated 8,000 apiece.<sup>19</sup> Only in Luanda did the Portuguese retain some authority and even there they failed to prevent the decisive MPLA coup in July. Moreover, the Portuguese were unable to keep their forces at strength and by the date of independence, November 10-11, only 2,000 soldiers remained to embark at Luanda.

The factors of politicization and military favoritism must be mentioned too. A portion of the Portuguese units were pro-MPLA, some were "neutral," some were anti-MPLA and pro-FNLA and pro-UNITA. The Portuguese commanders and High Commissioners learned that their powers could be highly political: the Lisbon government was pressured by political groups in Portugal and Angola to keep or dismiss High Commissioners on the basis of their actions and attitudes to the nationalist parties. High Commissioner (Admiral) Rosa Coutinho was considered very pro-MPLA, and is thought to have favored the strengthening of the MPLA by means of aid in arms, etc. High Commissioner Silva Cardoso (January-August, 1975) was considered neutral by FNLA and UNITA but hostile to the MPLA by Augustinho Neto.<sup>20</sup> It is clear that until July a number of Portuguese military units favored the MPLA and that support for that group came into Angola via Lisbon and the dominant Leftist parties and their allies.

When some Portuguese units turned on the MPLA in early July in Luanda, in revenge for a shooting incident, the MPLA leadership realized that the attitude of the Portuguese armed forces in Luanda might soon reflect the political move to the center and right beginning to sweep Portugal from northern rural towns.

Another factor lay in the actions of the African parties and their followers and allies. Again, the crucial background was in the Luanda area. The FNLA made a concerted attempt to win over both by propaganda and by intimidation the pro-MPLA population of the Luanda muceques. They did damage, but were unable to dislodge the pro-MPLA groups, in part because the MPLA, their allies in the Lisbon parties, and some Portuguese military personnel had distributed arms to these civilians. The MPLA was better organized politically and by spring had the muceques and surrounding towns "organized" in "Committees" which used the rubric of "poder popular" (People's power). These populations, some, but not all of them, ethnically Mbundu, sustained losses before the FNLA attacks and struck back. At times the MPLA armed forces and leadership lost control of their People's Power Committees who went on the rampage, sometimes with firearms, sometimes with machetes. It is hard to determine who began arming civilian militants first.



but both the MPLA and the FNLA were guilty of this, and the results were sometimes catastrophic. This murderous tendency, as much as the fighting between the FNLA and MPLA, and later the UNITA armies, caused the Portuguese mass exodus of 1975.<sup>21</sup> Ironically, the MPLA leader, Agostinho Neto, had worked to prevent an exodus of Portuguese which was burgeoning even as he signed the Alvor Agreement in Algarve in January. It is clear, however, that the MPLA and FNLA both suffered from a lack of cooperation from and a failure to maintain authority over their own forces and civilian partisans who took the law into their own hands on numerous occasions.

This is not the place to discuss the complex subject of foreign intervention. Nor is it possible, without official documentation, to determine who escalated aid first. There is a lot of good evidence already, however, that the heaviest foreign intervention in terms of dispatching arms, advisors, and the use of propaganda came from the FNLA's patron and ally, Zaire, and from the Soviet Union, Cuba and leftist forces in Portugal to the MPLA well before there was intervention by South Africa and the United States. By March 1975, Soviet bloc arms were being brought into Angola in considerable quantities and that Cuban aid was either planned or on the way. At the same time, Zaire

made real efforts to strengthen the FNLA and deal a knock-out blow to the MPLA. The crucial turning point in external intervention came in the weeks and months after the MPLA conquest of Luanda, July 9-15. The U.S. and South Africa, with pressures from Zaire and Zambia, then increased their commitment and in late August South African troops occupied dam facilities in the Kunene valley, south Angola, an act Portuguese authorities in Luanda considered to be "legal."<sup>22</sup>

The MPLA coup of July 9-15, 1975, in Luanda was a major turning point, even a point of no return.\* After the smoke cleared, the MPLA had driven out FNLA forces and personnel from all its installations, headquarters, caused a panic and rout among them, and had only to snuff out a few pockets of resistance in several industrial sections of the city, and in an old fort-prison where FNLA soldiers held out until August. The MPLA probably reasoned that, apart from revenge for the FNLA attacks since March, the taking of Luanda would strengthen their negotiating position later, if indeed anything of the Alvor Agreement could be saved. In any case,

\* For some indication of what areas which parties "controlled," see maps 1, 2, and 3, taken from published maps out of Expresso (Lisbon) and Veja (Sao Paulo), July-Nov., 1975. These maps are reproduced by xerox copies in the back of this paper.

having taken the capital with a minimum of Portuguese resistance, the MPLA could deal from a stronger position when and if elections were<sup>to be</sup> held. By early August, all FNLA and UNITA forces had withdrawn from the Luanda area, along with displaced civilians, the Portuguese massive airlift was underway with international support, and Holden Roberto declared "war" on his main rival in Luanda. Promising to capture Luanda within weeks, Roberto helped seal the fate of the Transitional Government and any hope for peace.

The Portuguese Government leadership in Lisbon and Luanda, besieged by political upheaval in Portugal, was helpless. On August 14, High Commissioner (interim) General Ferreira Macedo assumed "control" of the Transitional Government, which had, in effect, disbanded, due, he suggested, to the "incapacity" of its elements to continue. On August 29, there was an official abrogation of the Alvor Agreement. Portuguese armed forces dwindled in size, while the African forces burgeoned. There might have been a plan to send more troops to Angola, but Portugal's Government needed forces at home, and, even if some were dispatched, some soldiers refused to board the planes.

Combined with external intervention, the MPLA taking

of Luanda, Portuguese disunity and passivity, there was little that Portugal could have done to prevent the continuation of a civil war among African nationalists and their allies. The MPLA decided to ask for massive Soviet-Cuban assistance; this began to have an impact in Angola especially after early September, when the pro-MPLA Vasco Goncalves Government fell from power in Lisbon. On October 22, 1975, in the weekly Expresso there appeared a published interview by MPLA leader Neto. In the course of that important interview he stated:<sup>23</sup>

We conquered that right to independence and the recognition of Portugal of our right to independence came only after fourteen years of struggle. We feel that we deserve it and we are going to declare it. Whether Portugal wants it or not, we will be independent on the 11th (November). It is not Portugal, however, who comes to offer us the instruments of power. We are going to create them and to assume our responsibility.

Portugal had been unable to carry out her decolonization plans in Angola and that much-discussed "spirit of Alvor" was only a memory.\*

## II

On November 10, some hours before the official date for Angola's independence, the remainder of the Portuguese personnel and armed forces left Luanda. The High Commissioner

\* The reader may be referred back: on Sep. 23, 1975, Portugal had already accepted the MPLA demand that Portugal evacuate all troops by independence day, Nov. 11. In fact, Portugal evacuated the last of them, on two Portuguese ships, some hours before midnight, Nov. 10, the day before.

left but recognized no legal government, or party, and claimed that Portugal now granted sovereignty to "the people of Angola." Before he left the Angolan capital, however, he granted an interview to a Brazilian journalist from the Sao Paulo weekly, Veja. Admiral Leonel Cardoso was quoted as stating that powerful international groups were hankering after Angola's rich resources and that external forces were manipulating the Portuguese as well as all the African nationalist movements. Following his notable, "we are all puppets here," he ended the interview with the suggestion that "no government in Angola could last more than a week without the support of the MPLA."<sup>24</sup> In view of this, Portugal's insistence on not recognizing the MPLA's "People's Republic of Angola," reflected severe political disagreements and disunity at home over the Angolan issues.

To return to a question posed at the beginning: what were the connections between political conflicts in metropolitan Portugal and Portugal's inability to prevent what became a civil war in Angola? The first point to be made here is one made by Major Melo Antunes, Portugal's Foreign Minister: Portugal's ability to act decisively in Angola was seriously limited by the political battles in Portugal. As he stated in an interview granted in Luanda

on July 18, 1975:<sup>25</sup>

Portugal has tried to avoid, at all costs, direct intervention in the armed confrontations of the two movements... except when it is absolutely necessary...

Unfortunately, during these months, national public opinion was not sufficiently sensitive concerning decolonization problems, namely the problem of Angola, which was the most serious of all.

Partisan groups have made it worse with their acts, their press and public opinion have done a disservice... Portugal cannot support simultaneously this decolonization and a process of profound political, social and economic change now occurring in the Country.

A second point, referred to in this statement, is that one feature of partisan politics in Portugal was a press campaign which was strongly biased in favor of one African nationalist party, the MPLA. Except for a handful of papers,<sup>26</sup> most of the Lisbon press, the most influential sector of the country, openly favored the MPLA and bitterly attacked the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. The MPLA's propaganda campaign against the FNLA entered a more explicit phase in July and August. Numerous press reports appeared in Lisbon which attacked the FNLA as racist, tribalistic, savage and "primitive." On the basis of unconfirmed reports of the finding of bodies and parts of human organs in the MPLA capture of the FNLA facilities, including one building suggested to have been the old headquarters of the Portuguese white, provincial militia (OPVDCA), the non-democratic left papers in Lisbon, beginning on July 11, the day that Mario Soares resigned

from the Provisional Government, opened a barrage of press attacks.<sup>27</sup> In August this was followed by MPLA claims at an international "non-aligned" conference in Latin America that the FNLA had committed extensive atrocities,<sup>28</sup> including cannibalism. Whatever the truth of such claims and allegations, the MPLA propaganda directed against the FNLA in July and August, and strongly mirrored in the Lisbon press, was disconcerting if not effective. There was considerable irony in the fact that the anti-FNLA propaganda attacks strongly resembled the tone and language of the racist Portuguese propaganda used by the Salazar regime in 1961 to arouse political support from the people for the war effort in Angola.<sup>29</sup> It might also be suggested that this MPLA propaganda, designed to smear and discredit the FNLA and to gain or regain the political advantage and perhaps with it, Portuguese official diplomatic recognition by November 11, might have been deliberately designed to appeal to what was considered to be a relatively unsophisticated Portuguese audience both in Angola and in Portugal. In any event, with the present evidence at hand,<sup>30</sup> the FNLA propaganda against the MPLA was a lesser effort; if ruthless, the MPLA propagandists and their Lisbon allies were more persuasive than their opponents.

With the backdrop of escalating political struggle in Portugal, observers, whether partisan or "neutral" on the Angolan question, realized that there were connections between a move from the left to the center and right in Portugal, and a shift in Luanda. In published material Portuguese party members from various parties, including the FCP, MES, MDP, those in support of the Vasco Goncalves government throughout the "hot" summer of 1975, supported the MPLA, attacked the FNLA and UNITA, and opposed their support by any metropolitan party.<sup>31</sup> Some writers attempted to associate the Socialist Party's resignation from the Provisional Government and its campaign to win the allegiance of the moderate MFA elements against the non-democratic Left with the FNLA attacks in Luanda. A rather complete example of this type of political attack appeared in A Republica on July 15, 1975 and a translated text is appended below (see document #1).

While it is difficult now to document in detail the political impact of Portugal's withdrawal from Angola and the failure of efforts to maintain the Alvor Agreement, it is possible to suggest some immediate and long range consequences. In terms of immediate problems the most obvious ones emerge from the mass exodus of between 300,000 and 400,000 Portuguese from Angola beginning in 1974. Thousands more have left Mozambique. While some



have emigrated to South Africa, Brazil, Gabon, Namibia, and the Portuguese Atlantic islands, as well as to the United States and Canada, most of them have landed in Portugal. Out of this relatively massive population displacement have come enormous difficulties for the Provisional Government: increased unemployment, the expense of housing, feeding and maintaining this uprooted and disoriented group, and an increased law and order problem with an influx of private fire-arms and weapons.<sup>32</sup>

In political terms, the Provisional Government, even when able and anxious to aid the "retornados" (returned ones), saw itself threatened with armed conspiracies from several factions on the right which have fed on the discontent of the Angolan refugees; only the ELP and the MDLP may be mentioned here. But other partisan forces, including the political party, CDS (Social Democratic Center), have found more political support from these groups and have made choices among the warring Angolan nationalist movements.<sup>33</sup>

In effect, events in Angola and the arrival of the refugee population helped to polarize further an already divided and tense Portuguese population. A strong tendency was for public opinion, and the Governments which reflected the pressures of public opinion, to move to the

right. The events in Angola and the refugee factor played a role, too, in the excessive Government instability during the period, July 11, when Socialist leader Soares resigned from the Government, and November 25, when a radical non-democratic Leftist coup attempt failed. The Azevedo Pinheiro Government, successor in September of the Goncalves Government, was under severe pressure from the refugees, their allies and public responses to the disastrous turn of events in Angola. Among certain Portuguese factions on the right, and even perhaps in the center, a Portuguese version of the "stab in the back in Angola" emerged. Those who adhered to this thesis attacked the Government for its failure to protect Portuguese lives, jobs, and property in Angola, and by extension, in Mozambique; they criticized the Government for its failure to arrange for transportation back to Portugal in an adequate and timely manner, and ~~its~~ failure to maintain the refugees properly once they reached Portugal.

As the political parties prepared for the Spring 1976 general elections it was obvious that at least three key and hot political issues under debate were: (1) treatment of Angolan refugees (2) the status and future of Portuguese property, jobs and capital in independent Angola; and (3) diplomatic recognition and relations with the MPLA-

led "People's Republic of Angola," after the military defeat of the FNLA and UNITA forces during the three months following November 11, 1975.<sup>34</sup> Early in February, while the pro-recognition of MPLA group was still in a minority in the VI Provisional Government in Lisbon, a pro-MPLA Government spokesman, Minister for International Cooperation, Vitor Crespo, gave a revealing if questionable defense of the thesis of recognizing the MPLA government: after arguing that recognition of the MPLA government was now the only viable decision since it would affect relations with former colonies in Africa and with the "Third World." He continued:

The MPLA has the vocation to defend and to realize in the future a policy of non-alignment. The USSR support for MPLA was somewhat forced by the circumstances. There was, in fact, an initial involvement of the US and FNLA and UNITA through South Africa, which obliged the MPLA, in danger of near destruction, to get help for itself from its friends. 35

Even if Portugal does recognize the People's Republic of Angola, which seems increasingly likely,\* the Angolan factor will long continue to play an important role in Portuguese politics. The non-democratic Left's thesis

\* On February 22, 1976, the Portuguese Government officially recognized the "People's Republic of Angola."

that immediate decolonization would strengthen democracy in Portugal has been one which obscures the complexities of Portuguese politics and Portuguese-Angolan relations. In itself, independence for Angola was not necessarily a problem. More important were the ways in which the transition problem and independence would be carried out. The breakdown of the Alvor Agreement and the resulting civil war in Angola had among its unforeseen consequences a weakening of the non-democratic leftist political forces in Portugal and a strengthening of the center and right parties. Portuguese democratic processes were severely tested and even the role of the military in politics may have been modified by the Angolan backwash. By early 1976, the MFA leadership's role appeared to be changing from that of dominant decision-maker to that of a moderating power, the historic poder moderador symbolized in Portugal's constitutional past by the Monarch or President of the Republic.<sup>36</sup> By all accounts, the Angolan case was a crucial test for the new Portuguese democracy.

### III

In the course of this paper, several "master events" have been identified: the onset of armed clashes between the two main African nationalist rivals in March 1975; the

MPLA coup and consequent capture of Luanda in mid-July 1975; the escalation of aid from foreign powers, USSR, Cuba, US, Zaire and South Africa, in particular, to aid the respective African forces. Key times when foreign aid was decisive in influencing the outcome of military clashes were principally: the weeks before July 1975 when the MPLA organized its decisive coup; August 1975 when South African forces entered Angola; US aid to FNLA and UNITA followed by much more massive aid from USSR and Cuba, and East European states to MPLA, beginning in October.

Given the circumstances outlined here, what might have prevented the Angolan civil war from developing beyond say some early fighting? One answer some might offer is: armed intervention by an international organization, the UN or OAU. Even if such increasingly polarized, partisan bodies had been able to agree on such a plan and to launch an expeditionary force, there is little guarantee that their actions might have been effective. Unless the USSR and the US agreed on unified backing for such an expedition, this plan would not have been feasible. Moreover, the Angolan nationalist movements were in almost total agreement in their consistent opposition to international intervention in the form of an organized armed force.

Given Portugal's incapacity to contain the Angolan power struggle and prevent a civil war, it would have taken some external power's strong backing of the Provisional Government's plans and objectives. Even if the United States had been able to gain the Congressional support necessary for a massive, decisive backing of Portugal's army in Angola--something which proved impossible--few have asked the question: would the Portuguese Government and partisan leadership have been able to accept or utilize such aid during the struggle for power in Lisbon? Recent commentators' advocacy of Western aid earlier on a massive scale,<sup>37</sup> appears to be unrealistic. Economic aid through Western European friends was one thing, a large amount of aid for use in Angola, through the Armed Forces Movement and/or the Portuguese army in Angola but provided, say, by the United States, even if offered would probably have been turned down. In the summer of 1975 the non-Democratic Left attacked the democratic forces on many "guilt by association" issues, and U.S. aid, which might have resulted in the weakening or even defeat of the MPLA in Luanda, might have provided crucial political levers against the Socialist or Popular Democratic parties. It would have been virtually impossible for the United States to have acted directly in Angola under these circumstances.

Ideally, if one were to point to a period when decisive preventive action might have been taken one must look at the six months before the events of July 9-15, 1975. Ideally, again, Portugal might have had a better chance to enforce the Alvor Agreement if she had insisted upon two preconditions before making a final decolonization settlement: 1) the measures necessary to prevent the arming of civilians in Angola; 2) the disarming of the Angolan nationalist forces and their civilian partisans, as a first step toward building an Angolan national army. The analyst is confronted with a vicious circle: the Angolan insurgents' armed forces survived the war; the Portuguese wanted to cease fighting; the Angolan armed forces insisted on remaining armed against the day when they would struggle for power with their rivals; in part because they insisted upon remaining armed and intact the nationalist units never did become integrated into a "Mixed Forces" or Angolan army; hence, once fighting among the partisans began, short of massive outside intervention, which the Portuguese army was unable to manage, a civil war would continue.

What has happened in Angola in the last twelve months amounts to one of the greatest human tragedies in the history of modern Africa. The loss of life alone may or may not rank with the losses sustained in the Congo civil war, 1960-64,

and in the Nigerian-Biafran war, 1967-70, but their serious repercussions in domestic affairs in Portugal, in American foreign policy and politics, and internationally, are difficult now to calculate but must remain significant. In terms of the debate about the internationalization of the war, there seems to be a strong message to statesmen and politicians who value human life and human dignity above ideological superstitions: the internationalization had a murderous impact upon the people of Angola. As was demonstrated clearly in an oddly similar conflict- the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39- international intervention, unless carried out in the interests of conciliation and peace, lengthens wars and vastly raises the human costs.



NOTES

1. Historian Keith Middlemas, in Cabora Bassa: Engineering and Politics in Southern Africa (London, 1975), p. 319, states: "The war was not lost. Given adequate backing, the army could have held Mozambique for years more, as Frelimo privately acknowledged. Subversion and actual fighting never reached the scale of the war in Algeria in the 1950's." Middlemas' study and its conclusions, represent one of the most accurate and realistic works on the subject.
2. Personal conversations with American officials who served in the U.S. Consulate-General, Luanda, 1973-74, and a survey of the international press.
3. See Portuguese press, especially O Seculo, Diario de Noticias, Expresso, A Republica, May 1- July 1, 1974. See also interesting reports from Brazilian correspondents in Angola, in weekly magazine, Veja, (Sao Paulo), during this period.
4. See texts of these documents, speeches in Textos Historicos Da Revolucao, (Diabril Editoria, Lisbon), 1975, pp. 41ff.
5. Ibid., pp. 46ff.
6. Douglas L. Wheeler, "Portuguese-speaking Africa's Rocky Road to Self-Rule." The Christian Science Monitor (Sep. 9, 1974); for MFA program published just after the April 25, 1974 coup see pp. 41-46 in Textos Historicos Da Revolucao; see also article by Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal," The New York Review of Books, (April 17, 1975). For examples of party programs, views, see Cesar Oliveira, MFA E Revolucao Socialista (Diabril, London, 1975), which represents some views of the MES (Movement of the Socialist Left Party), close to those of the PCP; Edicoes Avante, Portuguese Communist Party, Programa E Estatutos Do PCP. Aprovados no. VII Congresso (Extraordinario realizado em 20/10/74) (Lisbon, 1974). Movimentos Democratico Portugues (MDP), Programa E Estatutos (Lisbon: December 1974), pp. 33-34, "Descolonizacao."

7. See Socialist leader Soares political memoirs published first when he was in exile in Paris: Le Portugal Baillone. Temoignage (Paris, 1972), especially pp. 91-120; English edition, published after revolution: Portugal's Struggle for Liberty (London: Allen & Unwin, 1975).
8. See Douglas L. Wheeler, "Portugal in Angola: A Living Colonialism?" in C. Botholm and R. Dane, (eds.), Southern Africa in Perspective: Essays in Regional Politics (New York, 1972), pp. 172-182.
9. My personal observations while visiting the Lisbon area during July 4-25, 1975, including a visit to one of the Angolan refugee camps at Costa da Caparica, lead me to conclude that perhaps thousands of black and brown Angolans accompanied fleeing Portuguese in the summer of 1975.
10. Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution," Foreign Affairs, (vol. 54, no. 2, Jan. 1976), p. 252.
11. See printed text of my testimony before the U.S. Senate subcommittee on Africa, June 16, 1975, published first in the African Studies Association's journal, Issue (Fall 1975, vol. V, no. 3), pp. 21-23.
12. For the text of the Alvor Agreement, January 15, 1975, see the official publication printed by the Portuguese government, Angola: The Independence Agreement (sic) (Lisbon: Ministry of Mass Communication, 1975), 30 pages. Texts were also published in the Portuguese press during the week of January 15-20, 1975.
13. Sources for this table of estimates of the armed forces operating in Angola during the period, April 25, 1974-January 2, 1976 include: my article, "African Elements in Portugal's Armies in Africa, 1961-1974" in Armed Forces and Society (vol. 2, no. 2, Winter 1975) (February 1976); Jornal Novo (Lisbon), June 21, 1975, p. 17; The New York Times (November 1-20, 1975); The Economist (November 22, 1975), pp. 47-51; Christian Science Monitor January 2, 1976, February 18, 1976, p. 1). Michael Kaufman in his Sunday magazine article (The New York Times, January 4, 1976) estimated that the FNLA had no more than 10,000 fighting men and that it represented the "largest of the armies;" this would seem to be a severe underestimate.

14. The Christian Science Monitor (Jan. 2, Feb. 18, 1976).  
I have not taken into account the evidence that Cuban aid was being funneled to the MPLA in Angola through Portugal before the large Cuban buildup began in October 1975.
15. Expresso, (March 28, 1975).
16. Expresso, (July 19, 1975).
17. Expresso, (July 12- Nov. 1, 1975); Veja (Sao Paulo), same period; The New York Times; The Christian Science Monitor; Le Monde, August 4- December 1975, documentation on Angola from this source was made available thanks to M. Rene Pelissier, Paris.
18. Personal correspondence with the Boston Branch of the International Red Cross, letter, November 1975, to the author.
19. Interview published in Veja (November 19, 1975).
20. See Expresso (October 1974- August 1975), and various newspapers from Portuguese press, including O Seculo; Diario de Noticias.
21. Veja (July 23, 1975), p. 27, the Veja report suggested that the incident which led to the battle of Luanda was a FNLA attack on a funeral for a female member of the MPLA: Expresso, (July 7, 12, 19, 1975); Expresso (May 10, 17, 1975); A Capital (July 21, 1975); Jornal Novo (June, July numbers, 1975).
22. Veja (November 19, 1975).
23. As quoted in Expresso (October 22, 1975).
24. As quoted in Veja (November 19, 1975).
25. As quoted in Diario Popular (Lisbon), July 18, 1975, p. 17.
26. Namely, the weekly Expresso, Jornal Novo, and O Tempo, with few exceptions.
27. Survey of Lisbon press, July 11-25, 1975 by author.

28. Le Monde (August 26, 1975).
29. Personal observations of author, documented in part by collection of newspapers from 1961-62 (Lisbon, Oporto press), and survey of literature printed by government agencies, including Agencia General do Ultramar. Observation of Government trucks with mobile "atrocities picture shows" parked at country fairs, in Algarve province, July, 1962.
30. For FNLA propaganda efforts see article in Veja (June 25, 1975), p. 34; FNLA hired a Brazilian public relations firm which worked in Luanda; among other jobs it performed was the printing and placing of numerous wallposters, in FNLA colors, proclaiming (in Portuguese) "Angola, love it or leave it;" see FNLA press releases placed, at times, in Lisbon press. Also, Le Monde.
31. See "Angola O CDS, A UNITA E O MPLA," in Vida Mundial (Lisbon), no. 1871 (July 24, 1975).
32. Expresso, issues during whole year of 1975; Tempo (Lisbon) June 19, 1975, "O drama cruel dos refugiados." In order to cope with refugee problems, the Government established, A Comissao dos Deslocados do Ultramar.
33. Strong conservative views on the Angolan issues appear also in publications for Portuguese emigrants living abroad. The Portuguese Times, of New Bedford, Massachusetts, for example, contains news of events in Angola, of the refugees and of viewpoints expressed in numerous, lengthy, letters to the editor.
34. On October 11, 1975, the major editorial of the independent, liberal, Expresso, referred to the Portuguese efforts to bring the warring parties in Angola to the bargaining table on a "minimum platform" of agreement "as a test for Portuguese foreign policy." It continued to state that Portugal at that time could not in good faith recognize the MPLA regime as it would be, "in effect, intervening in the internal affairs of another people and could compromise future relations which our country wants to maintain in Angola on a footing of absolute equality." By the third week of February, 1976, this newspaper's editorial policy had changed in favor

of recognition of the MPLA's "People's Republic of Angola," and the Portuguese government appeared to be close to a decision, based on a long-sought consensus, to give official recognition to the Angolan regime. A report claimed that the Portuguese Government had more than \$4.6 billion invested in "Angolan enterprises." New York Times (February 22, 1976), p. 8.

35. As quoted in Expresso, (February 7, 1976), p. 1.
36. For an historical analysis of the executive and the poder moderador in Portuguese history, 1820-1926, see Douglas L. Wheeler, Politics in the First Portuguese Republic, 1910-1926, Chapters II, VI-XIII (forthcoming).
37. For this view concerning Western aid to Portugal, see Kenneth Maxwell, "The Hidden Revolution in Portugal," The New York Review of Books (April 17, 1975), p. 34; Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution," Foreign Affairs (vol. 54, no. 2, January, 1976), pp. 266-268; Jane Kramer's article on Portugal in The New Yorker (December 15, 1975).

APPENDIX: DOCUMENT 1

(Published on page 16, A Republica (under control by a variety of Marxist-Leninist workers, some pro-USSR, some anti-USSR, beginning in May, 1975): July 15, 1975 ed.)

Communicado from MES (Socialist Left Movement):

ANGOLA's CAPITAL LIBERATED FROM FNLA MERCENARIES

In coordination with the escalation of counter-revolutionary forces in Portugal, developed in the last few days under the command of the Socialist Party, imperialism has launched, once again, in Angola, bloody actions, provocative, and unleashed by troops of the FNLA (many times with MPLA uniforms) and by reactionary whites. These actions have as an objective the placing of pressure upon the unfolding of the political process in Portugal, of favoring a move to the right in the crisis opened by the forces of the counter-revolution.

And, after affirming that the blood which runs in Angola is caused, "not by disputes among rival movements, as bourgeois and reactionary information tries to make us believe, but indeed as a consequence of the violence and perfidy of imperialism which does not shrink from the... most criminal acts...


In accord with which has already solemnly been said concerning previous provocations, the MPLA, assuming its historical responsibilities as the true and only Liberation Movement of the Angolan people, decided to counter-attack and put to an end definitively such provocations... the capital of Angola is now liberated from the mercenary FNLA forces which since their arrival (in Luanda) have comported themselves as foreign troops invading which they really are.

...MES hopes, on the other hand, that the MFA (Armed Forces Movement in Portugal and represented in Angola) now decisively committed to the construction of Socialism, knows how to assume its responsibilities in Angola, freeing itself from all ambiguities and repulsing the attitudes of an impossible and incoherent neutrality. The Alvor agreements, constantly violated by the FNLA, constitute, as MES has always affirmed, a compromise with imperialism which was imposed upon the Angolan people with the complicity of a political power in Portugal still too greatly conditioned by that very same imperialism.

(translation from the Portuguese by Douglas L. Wheeler)

VEJA

# AS FORÇAS EM LUTA EM ANGOLA (Jul. 23, 1975)



130

## AREAS "CONTROLADAS" OF AREAS "CONTROLLED" BY RIVAL PARTIES

### ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR


From:  
São Paulo weekly,  
VEJA  
map# 1: July 23, 1975  
map# 2: Nov. 19, 1975



2.

os dizem que só a guerra ac

FROM: ESPRESSO (July 19, 1975) Lisbon



Fo  
encl  
se te  
Soir  
me  
nã  
o p  
men  
cous  
pato  
gu  
ral  
ao 7  
e que  
meh  
Elen  
zule  
vã  
e  
tã  
e



ATE  
LMED  
-8